



MINISTRY OF EDUCATION,
AND SCIENCE



TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
ON RECRUITMENT INTO
TEACHING, PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, AND
RETENTION OF TEACHERS

Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
2012

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The current trend of education provision worldwide emphasizes the critical role of teachers, particularly in terms of access, quality and retention. Many research reports conducted internationally have shown that teacher quality has a major influence on the performance of school systems.

Quality education has many prerequisites. It implies the existence of an equitable teacher-to-pupil ratio, the provision of sufficient teaching materials, appropriate learning spaces and regular attendance. However, even where these are evident, the quality of education may continue to be adversely affected if teachers are not well trained and supported in their work and environment. While teacher preparation and development are at the center of any efforts to raise quality in education systems, the quality of teaching and learning—including how children participate in their own learning—is at the core of Child Friendly Schooling.

The Government of Mongolia, together with its education donors, is investing considerable resources into enhancing the quality of education, including through teacher training. However, it appears that the effectiveness of these programmes is often localized and may require significant monitoring, evaluation, documentation and adjustment for scaling up.

Teaching-related reforms are an emerging priority; however, there is a limited number of quality, substantive studies on teachers that have been conducted in Mongolia. As a consequence, the UNICEF Mongolia Office, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (former name), commissioned a study on recruitment into teaching, teacher development and retention of teachers in Mongolia in 2011. We would like to kindly thank the research team led by Gita Steiner Khamsi, Professor, Teachers College, Columbia University in New York and Batjargal Batkhuyag, Executive Director, Mongolian Education Alliance, Ulaanbaatar for their active participation in the realization of such an important goal. Their work has been a tremendous asset to our team and to the future of education in this country.

We very much hope that the findings and recommendations of this study will serve as a foundation to develop an effective strategic approach for making policy reforms for teacher education in Mongolia.

UNICEF Mongolia Office
September 2012

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There has been a great debate in recent years on the shift from *Education for All* to *Learning for All*. The argument has been made by many that providing access to education is not sufficient. Enrollment in school is only the first step; what happens subsequently at school and during class is equally important. Many things have to occur in an education system to transform schools into incubators for the personal, social, and cognitive growth of children and youth. Unsurprisingly, great pressure has been placed on teachers to fulfill these high expectations associated with formal education.

Most of the studies on teachers deal with teacher development, notably with pre-service and in-service teacher education. This study moves beyond the narrow focus on professional development and examines recruitment into teaching, teacher salary and a host of other factors that impact the quality of teaching. We carried out the study in the spring and summer of 2011. Mongolia is a fast growing economy and its residents experience social and economic change at a breathtaking pace. Naturally, every study is a snapshot of developments at a particular time and moment in history; however, Mongolia is an interesting case in point of teacher development because it has undergone a major teacher salary reform in 2007. We list four recent developments to depict how the education sector is continuously undergoing changes.

In the first half of 2012, the salary for teachers—along with wages for all public service employees—was increased twice. On February 1, 2012, salaries were raised by 80,000 MNT, representing an average increase of 25 percent. On May 1, 2012, the base salary was increased by another 23 percent. Thus, the salary of a teacher is, as of May 1, 2012, on average 465,466 MNT (\$354) for entry-level positions. Another important change involves the employment of school principals. The most recent Education Law Amendment (Article 9, Section 30.1.15), passed in May 2012, repositioned the hiring mechanism for principals to mitigate the effects of interpersonal networks and to increase merit-based employment. Principals are once again hired by the province or city-level education authorities, and not by the local government. Finally, a very popular program from the socialist times was reintroduced with the Education Law Amendment of 2012; according to Article 13, Section 40.8, teachers are entitled to professional development for all five years, paid from the State budget.

This study provides important clues on how to further improve the quality of teaching in Mongolia. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (former name) guided us through the process and made sure that we examined research questions that are relevant for ongoing reforms in Mongolia. We are very pleased that UNICEF and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science have entrusted us with carrying out this empirical study on teachers and hope that the findings will be used for further policy decisions and dialogue.

September, 2012

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

B.A.	Bachelor of Arts degree
CEECIS	Central and Eastern Europe & Commonwealth of Independent States
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECD	Education and Culture Department
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
EU	European Union
FTI	Fast Track Initiatives
FYR	Former Yugoslav Republic
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MEA	Mongolian Education Alliance
MECS	Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
MNT	Mongolian Tögrögs
MSUE	Mongolian State University of Education
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PISA	Program for International Student Assessment
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Science
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	United States Dollar

Note: Administratively, Mongolia is divided into 21 aimags/provinces and the capital city. The 21 aimags are constituted into 329 soums and these further into 1,550 baghs.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examined recruitment into teaching, teacher development and retention of teachers in Mongolia. It included a desk review of relevant policies and regulations, an empirical study in 28 schools located in Ulaanbaatar and in five provinces, as well as individual interviews with teachers, school administrators, policy analysts, and government officials. Special emphasis was placed on the 2007 teacher salary reform. The study examined changes over time (before and after 2007) and also investigated how this particular reform was implemented at the school level.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Four types of information were included in this study:

- EMIS data as well as other statistical information on the composition of the teaching workforce
- Information on recruitment into teaching and pre-service teacher education, with a special emphasis on the largest teacher training institution in the country, that is, the Mongolian State University of Education (MSUE)
- Regulations and decrees with regard to teacher workload, salary, licensing regulations, in-service training, promotion, bonus systems, etc.
- School-level data on actual teaching load, total teaching pay, actual in-service training, oversupply/undersupply of teachers, actual bonus payments, etc.

The school-level data cover interviews with education managers (N=35) and teachers (N=123), as well as a series of documents collected at the school level, such as school lesson schedules by teacher name, qualifications of teachers and subject(s) taught, lesson plans, teachers' teaching hours lists, teachers' evaluation and bonus allowance forms, and examples of contracts. A total of 28 schools were visited: nine city schools (in Ulaanbaatar and Erdenet), eight *aimag*-center schools, and eleven *soum*-center schools in Khentii, Khovd, Arkhangai and Omnogobi provinces.

THE ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TEACHER SALARY IN MONGOLIA

The average monthly base salary of school teachers in Mongolia was 324,292 MNT (270 USD) for the 2010/11 school year. The total monthly pay was 374,727 MNT (299 USD) if additional teaching hours, supplements for functions, supplements for rank, and bonuses for a teacher of average income are factored in. Currently, the base salary accounts for 86.5 percent of total teacher pay. As the PETS Mongolia Study demonstrated in 2005 (that is, before the salary reform of 2007), the base salary of a teacher only amounted to 52-56 percent of the total pay; the rest of the income came mainly from the high amount of additional teaching hours as well as the numerous salary supplements.

The large ratio of the base salary as a percentage of the total pay (86.5 percent) was an explicit goal of the 2007 salary reform. Consequently, teacher salary has become more predictable and transparent, and teachers are less vulnerable to the arbitrary decisions of school administrators. The *absolute* base

salary more than doubled between the school years 2006/07 and 2007/08, which reflects the structural changes made as part of the 2007 reform. Furthermore, the teaching load system that paid teachers by the number of hours worked was replaced with the weekly workload system based on 40 hours of work. In the school year of 2010/2011, the average base salary was three times higher than in 2006/07, reflecting a growth greater than inflation-related growth for the same time period. The *relative* base salary is high; only 5.5 percent of the population earns 400,000 MNT or more per month. Thus, a teacher's salary is now approximately in the top 5th-10th income percentile of the working population.

COMPOSITION OF THE TEACHING WORKFORCE

There are 44,143 persons working in primary and secondary schools. Of those, roughly sixty percent are teachers. The large number of non-teaching staff is, among other reasons, directly related to school-based management that was introduced in schools of Mongolia in the late 1990s. Regardless of school size, almost every one of the 751 primary and secondary schools has a management team with at least five staff members: a principal, an education manager (larger schools have two or more education managers), a school social worker, an accountant, an inventory clerk and—if the school has a dormitory—a dormitory administrator. Over eighty percent of the school staff is female; yet there is a gap in gender parity for the position of school principal, illuminating the underrepresentation of women at the senior levels of school administration. The teaching workforce in Mongolia is young, as 30.6 percent of all teachers have worked in schools for five years. The teaching workforce is also relatively well-qualified; two-thirds of all teachers (64.9 percent) hold a bachelor's degree, and only 175 teachers out of a total of 26,358 teachers are unqualified teachers (0.7 percent), compared to 12.1 percent for the school year of 1996/7. The significant improvement in teacher qualifications over the past fourteen years has resulted from a higher education boom, which allowed good universities to flourish simultaneously with small and private universities that, under closer scrutiny, turned out to be just degree mills. It is therefore important to distinguish between teacher qualifications (degree) and teacher quality (effectiveness).

There are four ranks or titles of teachers: regular teacher, methodologist teacher, lead teacher, and advisor teacher. Only 1.3 percent of all teachers held the rank of advisor teacher in 2009/10, while slightly less than half of the teachers were at the lowest professional rank—that is, they were regular teachers who did not receive any rank supplement. It is remarkable that there is a wide variety of subject teachers; some are licensed to teach one subject (e.g., math), whereas others are licensed to teach two subjects (e.g., math and physics). In Mongolia, there are at least 29 registration codes for subject specialization. This is especially interesting considering there is a global trend to prepare teachers in multiple subject areas (2-3 subjects) rather than in one individual subject only.

Teacher shortage in Mongolia is virtually non-existent from a statistical perspective (0.4 percent). However, as other UNICEF studies on teachers have convincingly shown, statistical averages on teacher shortage mask the extent of real teacher shortage for a variety of reasons; for instance, schools cope with the shortage of qualified teachers in a given subject by filling the position with unqualified or under-qualified substitute teachers. The statistical figure on teacher shortage thus only captures the teaching posts that, despite these coping strategies, could not be filled at the beginning of the school year. Judging from the large enrollment in “specialization conversion training,” one must assume that there is a number of teachers who teach additional subjects for which they have not received any training. From an educational quality perspective, it is key to systematically introduce multi-subject teaching or teaching in subject areas in pre-service teacher education; otherwise, smaller schools will continue to

have a large number of teachers who rely on additional hours in other subjects in order to attain a full teaching load and a full salary.

RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING

Fifty-three percent of teacher education students study at MSUE in Ulaanbaatar or Arkhangai. This study therefore focused on an analysis of MSUE data and selected three departments that are very different from each other: the Department of Primary Teacher Education, the Department of Foreign Languages, and the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature. The research team was able to reconstruct four of the five indicators for effective recruitment into teaching: admission rate and criteria, enrollment rate, completion rate, and university-to-work transition rate. The findings show that there was a surge in applications and enrollments in 2006/07 and 2007/08, when teachers' salaries were significantly raised, and the demand for teachers had grown due to the expansion of general education from 10 to 11, and later on, from 11 to 12 years. The average test scores also improved considerably in all three departments, and especially for applicants to the Department of Foreign Languages. In 2006/07, the average test score of applicants for the Department of Foreign Languages was 540 points; four years later, in 2010/11, the average was 710 points. The completion rate was low in the Department of Foreign Languages; approximately 30 percent of students in that department either switched to other departments, interrupted their studies, failed the final exam, found employment before completing their studies, or, for other reasons, did not finish their studies in the required period of four years. The biggest problem in Mongolia is the low university-to-work transition rate. Only approximately one-quarter of the graduates of pre-service teacher education programs actually end up working as teachers. In 2010/2011, only 1,171 teachers were newly hired. Yet, approximately 5,000 teacher education graduates were produced in that year and the majority of them were on the job market.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 SALARY REFORM AT THE SCHOOL LEVEL

This study focused on five objectives of the reform and examined whether the following goals were accomplished at the school level: (1) a reduction of weekly teaching hours; (2) more predictable and transparent income; (3) a reduction of income inequalities between teachers in rural and urban schools; (4) full-time employment as a teacher; and (5) making the teaching profession more attractive and reputable. All five objectives of the reform can ultimately improve quality in education and therefore deserve closer attention. It is assumed that instructional quality improves significantly if teachers are able to teach fewer hours per week; only teach subjects for which they received training; entirely focus on their teaching rather than pursue multiple jobs; are motivated in their work; and are highly regarded by others. Based on an evaluation of how the reform has been implemented, the research team makes the following recommendations:

- The statutory teaching load in Mongolia is 646 hours per year (19 hours per week), but the actual average teaching load is 697 hours per year (20.4 hours per week). It is much lower than the OECD average of 779 hours (primary), 701 hours (lower secondary) and 656 hours (upper secondary). It is recommended to raise the statutory teaching from 19 to 20 hours per week and increase the base salary accordingly. In the long term, when the education system possibly moves from the two-shift to the one-shift system, the weekly instructional hours should be raised even further.
- The current salary is composed of six elements: base salary, additional hours, supplements for function, supplement for rank, bonuses for performance (three types of bonuses), and general

benefits for public servants. In the long run, the fragmentation could be further reduced to four elements, with additional hours and supplementary functions being the exception rather than the rule. Many educational systems compensate internally, that is, teachers who teach fewer hours normally have to take on additional functions, and vice versa.

- There is a need to revise the criteria for promotion from methodologist to lead teacher in order to ensure that teachers from rural schools are not at a disadvantage.
- Teachers do not remain on the school premises upon completion of their teaching hours, mainly because of a shortage of space for them, but also because of lapses in real accountability. Today, all teachers in Mongolia in effect work part-time. Despite the move from the teaching load (19 hours/week) to the weekly workload system (40 hours/week), teachers only stay at school for 19 hours or 20.4 hours/week, respectively. In the next phases of planning, the teachers' rooms should be upgraded, and space for private meetings with parents should be established. In the long run, a greater number of larger schools should be built to replace the two-shift system with a one-shift system, in which teachers work for longer hours at the school and students have more formal instruction and more school-organized afterschool activities. In addition, there is a need to review the functions and payment of education managers; they are the only teachers who currently work full-time at school, yet they have fewer opportunities to make additional money from teaching extra hours or receiving seniority gifts every five years.
- Overall, the teaching profession has become more attractive and teacher education studies entice a great number of students. It is important, however, to implement more rigorous quality assurance mechanisms in the smaller, private teacher education B.A. programs.

Based on the key findings, it is accurate to conclude that the 2007 salary reform has had a major positive impact on the working conditions of teachers, teacher's income, and the overall reputation of the teaching profession.

TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS AND THE BONUS SYSTEM

Chapter 5 of the report presents data on the three different bonus systems and factors them into the total pay of teachers. The average total monthly pay of teachers—with additional teaching hours, functional and rank supplements, and bonuses—is 374,171 MNT, as mentioned previously. A typical high-income total pay for a teacher is 546,737 MNT, and a typical low-income total monthly income is 317,079 MNT. The findings suggest that the current bonus system is fundamentally flawed and therefore deserves a thorough revision. Each of the three bonuses is problematic for a different reason:

- The bonuses for Olympiads and competitions reward teachers for focusing on high-performing students and, by implication, make them neglect the rest of the class.
- The bonuses for outcomes-based contracts entirely rely on funds generated at the school level and thus generate inequalities between large (resource-rich) schools and small (resource-poor) schools.
- The bonuses for quarterly performance are financed from the centrally allocated salary fund but, in effect, function as a 13th monthly salary in that the bonus is given indiscriminately to almost every teacher at the school. This undermines the purpose of a performance-based bonus.

From the perspective of education managers, there is considerable overlap in the evaluation criteria for the outcomes-based contract and the quarterly performance payments.

TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS

This study pursued three research questions that are inextricably linked to issues related to the effectiveness and the quality of teaching: (1) What percentage of teachers serve as substitute teachers, that is, teach subjects for which they were not trained?; (2) what are the licensing criteria and quality assurance procedures?; and (3) how and for which groups of teachers is in-service teacher training provided?

There are three groups of teachers who work as non-licensed teachers in Mongolia:

- Group 1** **Young teachers:** New teachers who graduated from pre-service teacher education and have only taught for 1 or 2 years. In most cases, they are granted a teaching license after submitting relevant documents for review.

- Group 2** **Non-teachers:** Professionals with a higher education degree who switched to the teaching profession (e.g., an economist who teaches math).

- Group 3** **Teachers with another subject specialization:** Teachers who teach subjects for which they had no teacher training (e.g., a math teacher who teaches biology).

The teachers in the groups 2 and 3 are considered “substitute teachers” (in international terminology). From a quality perspective, substitute teachers are problematic because they teach subjects for which they were not trained. It is difficult to assess the number of substitute teachers, because there is little awareness among education managers that substitute teachers are in effect unqualified (group 2) or under-qualified (group 3), respectively. Many education managers do not report them as substitute teachers, especially if they have worked for many years at the school.

In an attempt to implement a quality assurance mechanism, a teacher licensing scheme was introduced (MECS Ministerial Order #72). It targeted not only new teachers in the first two years of their teaching, but also professionals from other fields who switched to the teaching profession. In addition, MECS Ministerial Order #72 focused on teachers who were teaching a second or third subject for which they did not have a license. As a result of this regulation, “specialization conversion training programs” mushroomed, very much to the financial benefit of teacher training institutions. An evaluation of these training programs that are mostly self-financed is urgently needed. There were also major delays reported at the school level in the review of the licensing applications. It is recommended to streamline and simplify the application procedure, especially for the young specialists who are supposed to submit their application package one year after they graduate from pre-service teacher training.

A second major initiative to enhance teacher effectiveness was launched with the comprehensive in-service teacher training strategy. MECS Ministerial Order #74 from 2008 prescribes a comprehensive and coherent system of in-service teacher training that includes (a) basic training every five years; (b) specialized training with credit-bearing as well as non-credit courses; and (c) independent studies. The basic training has been resurrected from the past and has remained very popular among teachers. It seems that teachers raise their expectations for getting promoted by enrolling in credit-bearing courses for which they pay out-of-pocket. The ratio of teachers who have been promoted to lead teacher or

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advisor teacher has diminished and therefore generated unease among teachers who invested financially in their professional development. The self-finance regulations as well as the close association between professional development and promotion (see Table 7) need to be revisited.

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The so-called basic training that, within a five-year period, will have reached out to every teacher in the country is impressive and comprehensive. Until now, the central level was only able to secure funding for the 5th year teachers. The City Department of Education not only succeeded in enrolling 5th year teachers, but also started to reach out to 1st year teachers. Additional funding is needed to also enroll 1st year and 10th year teachers across the country.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

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TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING,
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF TEACHERS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Government of Mongolia launched a salary reform in 2007 that significantly improved the situation of teachers, making the teaching profession more attractive. The base salary was raised significantly; several salary supplements were integrated into the base salary; and the number of additional teaching hours that teachers were permitted to teach was limited. The 2007 reform was fundamental and was subsequently accompanied by a series of other regulations that dealt with ethical standards, licensing requirements, incentive schemes and promotion regulations. The recent developments in Mongolia reflect an international trend to pay greater attention to teacher quality and motivation. In an effort to support the initiatives of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MECS), UNICEF Mongolia provided funds to MECS to analyze more closely the current situation of teachers in Mongolia.

This UNICEF Mongolia Study on Teachers therefore describes the fundamental reforms that took place over the past few years, then examines their implementation in practice, and finally identifies areas in need of improvement. The first chapter provides the larger context of the study and presents the research design of the study.

1.1. EDUCATION FOR ALL VERSUS LEARNING FOR ALL

For the past few years, the effectiveness of educational reforms—including those funded by development partners—has been typically measured in terms of whether a reform did indeed enhance student outcomes. Progress in assessment has been made in two directions. On one hand, there are discernible attempts to move away from measuring student outcomes exclusively in terms of standardized test results. Clearly, the debate on competencies, and most recently on skills, has broadened the earlier focus on cognitive skills. On the other hand, there is a growing number of researchers who are exploring factors that impact student learning. It is currently widely acknowledged that teacher quality scores very high among the drivers for student learning. One of the frequently cited studies even claims that teacher quality is a better predictor of student outcomes than class size or the money spent per student (see McKinsey 2007).¹

The emphasis on student outcomes or student learning is reflected in the new education sector strategies of development partners. Both the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank have moved away from emphasizing access to quality education (Education for All) and now propagate access and outcomes of quality education. The current DFID strategy is called *2010-2015 Learning for All*, and the recently released World Bank Education Strategy 2020 is entitled *Learning for All: Investing in People's Knowledge and Skills to Promote Development*. Governments in different parts of the world, both in developing and in developed countries, are facing the challenge of how to best recruit graduates into teaching, to develop effective teachers, and then to retain them on the job. The shortage of qualified and effective teachers is a global phenomenon and has led to numerous organizations ranging from the OECD (2005) to McKinsey (2007, 2010) emphasizing the importance of attracting, developing, and retaining effective teachers.²

¹ McKinsey & Co. (2007). *How the Best Performing School Systems Came Out on Top*. London: McKinsey & Co.; see also: McKinsey Report (2010). *Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top third graduates to a career in teaching*. London: McKinsey & Company.

² OECD. (2005). *Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing, and Retaining Effective Teachers*. Paris: OECD; McKinsey & Co. (2007). *How the Best Performing School Systems Came Out on Top*. London: McKinsey & Co.; McKinsey Report (2010). *Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top third graduates to a career in teaching*. London: McKinsey & Company.

In line with other development partners, UNICEF has focused its attention to the topic. Several country and regional offices of UNICEF commissioned studies on teacher supply and quality. There are nine other studies in particular that have applied a similar interpretive framework and have used a similar methodological approach. They are as follows:

UNICEF CEECIS Region (Central and Eastern Europe & Commonwealth of Independent States) with national studies in the following countries:

- Armenia
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- FYR Macedonia
- Kyrgyzstan
- Moldova
- Uzbekistan

UNICEF ESARO (Eastern and Southern Africa Office) with national studies in:

- Lesotho
- Malawi
- Swaziland

One of the co-authors of this report, Gita Steiner-Khamsi, served as the research team leader of the two regional and nine national UNICEF studies listed above. The consistency in interpretive framework and methodological approach makes it possible to compare the situation of teachers across regions and countries. The next section demonstrates the similarity of the Mongolian teacher salary system with that in former socialist countries of the CEECIS Region.

1.2. THE TEACHER SALARY SYSTEM IN MONGOLIA: A COMPARISON WITH THE CEECIS REGION

Since the salary reform of 2007, teachers in Mongolia have been earning on average higher salaries than other public servants. Only the salaries of those who work in government administration or finance and insurance sectors are comparable to the wages of teachers.³ As the pilot research project of the Ministry of Labor (2011) illuminated, public servants earn on average 230,500 MNT in terms of base salary (87.4 percent of the total monthly pay); 27,000 MNT in the form of supplements (10.2 percent); and 6,200 MNT for transportation. As shown in Table 1 below, teachers in Mongolia, however, earn on average 324,292 MNT per month.

The pilot study of the Ministry of Labor further demonstrates that the average teacher salary ranks among the top 5-10 percent of salaries in the public and private sector. Approximately one-third of the population in Mongolia (28-35 percent) lives on the minimum wage of 108,000 MNT or less.

³ See report of the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia. (2011). *Policy Analysis Report on Salary Structure. Pilot Research*. Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Labor.

Only 5.5 percent of the population earns 400,000 MNT or more per month. This means that teachers are in the highest or second-highest income percentiles of the working population. The average base salary (without supplements and additions that would make up total monthly pay) amounts to what 5 to 10 percent of the total population earns.

Table 1 provides a preview and compares the average monthly salary of teachers in Mongolia with that of teachers in other former socialist countries.

Table 1: Monthly Teacher Salary in Mongolia and in the CEECIS Region, 2010/2011

Country	Average Base Salary, Local Currency	Average Base Salary, US Dollars	Average Total Pay, Local Currency	Average Total Pay, US Dollars
Armenia	116,000 AMD	314 USD	81,591 AMD	221 USD
Bosnia & Herzegovina	691 BAM	498 USD	691 BAM	498 USD
FYR Macedonia	19,300 MKD	448 USD	19,300 MKD	448 USD
Georgia	245 GEL	144 USD	307 GEL	181 USD
Kyrgyzstan	1,441 KGS	30 USD	3,908 KGS	82 USD
Moldova	2,200 MDL	184 USD	3,760 MDL	315 USD
Mongolia	324,292 MNT ¹	270 USD	374,727 MNT ²	299 USD
Tajikistan	88 TJS	20 USD	118 TJS	26 USD
Uzbekistan	261,402 UZS	154 USD	329,940 USZ	195 USD

Source: For data on CEECIS countries, see UNICEF CEECIS (2011).⁴

Without using an additional conversion method (e.g., Atlas conversion or PPP), the average income figures are difficult to interpret or to compare. Nevertheless, Table 1 above illustrates the relation between average base salary and average total pay in the CEECIS region. In two of the countries of the CEECIS region (FYR Macedonia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina), the average base salary and the average total pay are identical. On the other end of the spectrum is the teacher salary in Kyrgyzstan. The average total pay of teachers in Kyrgyzstan (82 USD) is almost three times as much as the base salary (30 USD), because teachers take on additional hours and receive salary supplements for all kinds of tasks, including pedagogical ones such as grading student notebooks or serving as homeroom teachers.

Table 1 manifests structural differences in the salaries of various countries. There is a large difference between the base salary and the total pay in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for the following reason: most former socialist countries—with the exception of former Yugoslav countries—had the teaching load system, or the so-called *stavka* system, in place.⁵ The *stavka* (Russian for teaching load) system is a carryover from communist times that has existed for many decades in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and—until 2007—also Mongolia. The *stavka* system pays the teacher for the number of hours he or she is teaching per week, so the base salary is defined in terms of the statutory teaching load. All other activities, including pedagogical ones such as grading student notebooks, managing a laboratory, and serving as a homeroom teacher are regulated, noted, and compensated separately. In Mongolia, the gap between base salary (first column) and total pay (third column) has narrowed considerably over time. Currently, the base salary accounts for 86.5 percent of the total pay of the teacher. As the PETS (Public

⁴ UNICEF CEECIS. (2011). *Teachers: A Regional Study on Recruitment, Development and Salaries of Teachers in the CEECIS Region*. Geneva: UNICEF CEECIS. Author: Gita Steiner-Khamsi, with feedback from Erin Weeks-Earp and Philippe Testot-Ferry and Erin Tanner (UNICEF CEECIS, Geneva).

⁵ See Steiner-Khamsi Gita, Harris-van Keuren, Christine with Iveta Silova and Ketevan Chachkhiani (2009). *Decentralization and Recentralization Reforms: Their impact on teacher salaries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia*. Background paper for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2009. Paris: UNESCO GMR.

Expenditure Tracking Survey) Mongolia Study demonstrated in 2005—that is, before the salary reform of 2007—the base salary of a teacher only amounted to 52-56 percent of the total pay; the rest of the income came mainly from (the great number of) additional teaching hours as well as the numerous salary supplements. The high ratio of the base salary as a percentage of the total pay was an explicit goal of the 2007 salary reform. It has helped to make the teacher salary more predictable and transparent and the teacher less vulnerable to arbitrary decisions of school administrators.

Figure 1 illustrates how the two employment systems differ significantly. In the weekly workload system, teachers are hired as employees who work eight hours per day and five days per week, for a total of 40 hours per week. For instance, teachers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in FYR Macedonia are typically hired under the workload system. Their workload consists of 40 hours per week, of which 18-24 hours (Bosnia and Herzegovina) or 20-23 hours (FYR Macedonia) are for teaching, while the remainder of the time is used for lesson planning, substitute teaching for absent teachers, assisting struggling students, meeting with parents, doing administrative work, and preparing for Olympiads (academic competitions).

In stark contrast, teachers who are hired under a weekly teaching load system (“*stavka* system”) are compensated per teaching load. The statutory teaching load depends on the grade level (primary versus lower/upper secondary school) and is typically 18-22 hours per week. The system is extremely flexible, and teachers are employed from 0.25 of a *stavka* to 1.5 *stavkas*, or in locations with severe teacher shortage, for 2 *stavkas*. They are compensated separately for all additional functions. These functions may include grading student notebooks, working as a homeroom teacher, mentoring other teachers, and/or taking on additional hours as a substitute teacher for absent teachers. Teachers expect to be remunerated for these additional functions, and they are not expected to stay on the school premises to engage with students, parents, or other colleagues after school. Many initiatives that attempt to strengthen student-centered teaching methods do not sufficiently consider the limitations of the *stavka* system in terms of additional pedagogical work. Not surprisingly, teachers in the region complain about the additional work that student-centered teaching requires—that is, the additional lesson planning and student evaluation for which they are not compensated.

As shown in Figure 1, the base salary for one teaching load of 18-22 hours is naturally much lower than the base salary of teachers hired under the 40-hour weekly workload system. Precisely because the base salary in the *stavka* system only covers the number of teaching hours taught per week, it is important to factor the additional functions into the total pay of teachers.

Figure 1: Teacher Salary Systems: the Divide




As mentioned previously, the weekly workload system is in effect in most EU countries, as well as in two of the participating countries of the UNICEF CEECIS study, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia. In the other participating countries of the UNICEF CEECIS study on teachers—Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan—teachers are hired under the *stavka* system.

The 2007 salary reform in Mongolia is a remarkable case because it mirrors the shift from the weekly teaching load system to the total workload system. Thus, since September 1, 2007, teachers in schools and kindergartens of Mongolia have been paid for 40 hours of work per week, nineteen hours of which are assigned for teaching.⁶ Prior to the fundamental salary reform of 2007, teachers were paid solely for the number of hours they were teaching. The next section provides a historical overview of the teacher salary system in Mongolia.

1.3. THE TEACHER SALARY SYSTEM IN MONGOLIA: A HISTORICAL SKETCH

The main features of the two employment systems—teaching workload versus total workload—are summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Main Distinctions between the Two Salary Systems



Source: Modified figure from UNICEF CEECIS (2011).

⁶ Joint Order of the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, the Minister of Social Protection and Labor, and the Minister of Finance (2007). *On adopting the procedure to set the work norms of kindergarten and generation education school teachers, and to calculate and discharge the salaries of teachers and certain other officials*. Date: August 31, 2007, Order: Number 307/91/237. Ulaanbaatar.

The PETS Mongolia study clearly demonstrated that the teaching load or *stavka system* benefited teachers in urban and semi-urban schools of Mongolia who were able to teach more additional hours and get reimbursed for additional hours than teachers in *soum*-schools.⁷ Under the previous teaching load system in Mongolia, a teacher's total pay consisted of base salary for 19 hours, additional teaching hours, salary supplements (including supplement for a teacher's rank), and bonuses. On average, 17.4 percent of the total pay of teachers in urban schools (schools in Ulaanbaatar and in *aimag* centers) consisted of payments for additional teaching hours. The ratio was significantly lower for teachers in rural schools; their additional teaching hours only accounted for 13.4 percent of the total pay. As a result, teachers in rural schools had to rely on their meager base salary to make a living. In fact, the base salary accounted for 62 percent of the total pay for teachers who worked in rural schools. In contrast, the base salary only represented 55 percent of the total monthly pay of teachers in urban schools, as they could make additional money by taking on additional hours. The previous teaching working load system generated inequality, because it negatively affected those teachers who worked under difficult circumstances, such as those teachers in small rural schools with fewer opportunities to teach additional hours. On the other hand, it benefited teachers who worked in overcrowded semi-urban (*aimag* center) schools and in Ulaanbaatar who were able to take on additional teaching hours and boost their income. Educationally, however, it was disadvantageous for students in all types of schools. In urban schools, teachers ended up with either too many instruction hours or hours in subjects for which they had little or no training. In rural schools, teachers were unmotivated and only remained on the post because they lacked better professional opportunities. Ultimately, the students were the ones who suffered from the low instructional quality or, more precisely, from being instructed by teachers who took on additional teaching hours in subjects they knew very little about.

The *Education for All* Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI) recognized the importance of teacher salaries for ensuring universal primary school completion. The rationale was that an appropriate teacher salary does not only ensure a sufficient supply of teachers, but also enhances the quality of education. This benchmark was proposed in the EFA FTI Indicative Framework, whereby the teacher salary was recommended to be 3.5 times the average GDP per capita in a country. In Mongolia, the average teacher salary was 1.7 times the GDP per capita in 2005, but after the structural reform of 2007/08, the average salary was increased to 3.58 times the GDP per capita. Mongolia is the only country in the region that approximates, and in fact slightly exceeds, the EFA FTI benchmark.

In short sequence, the Government of Mongolia raised the teacher salaries three times in 2006 and 2007 to reflect the economic growth that the country had been experiencing since 2005. As Table 2 shows, teacher salaries in Mongolia were increased by 36 percent from 2006 to 2007.

⁷ World Bank. (2006). *Public Financing of Education .Equity and Efficiency Implications* .Washington, DC: World Bank; see Table 19 in the PETS report on the composition of total teacher pay in Mongolia.

Table 2: Increase of Teacher Salaries in Mongolia between 2006 and 2007 (in MNT)

Category of Teacher	Decree No 12 of 2006		Decree No 147 of 2006		Decree No 13 of 2007	
	Base Salary	Hourly Rate	Base Salary	Hourly Rate	Base Salary	Hourly Rate
1 (1-5 years)	65650	863.8	76323	1004.2	91588	1205.1
2 (6-12 years)	70070	921.9	81357	1070.5	97628	1284.6
3 (13-18 years)	74360	978.4	86391	1136.7	103669	1364.0
4 (19-24 years)	78650	1034.8	91425	1202.9	109710	1443.5
5 (25+ years)	83070	1093.0	96459	1269.2	115751	1523.0
Average Growth	100%	100%	16%	16%	20%	20%

Source: Ministry of Education, Finance and Economic Department (February 2007). *Reform of Teacher Salaries* (p. 4).

The biggest increase, however, went into effect in the school year 2007/2008. In September 2007, the weekly workload (40 hours) replaced the previous system that calculated salaries based on the weekly teaching load of 19 hours. As Table 3 illustrates, this structural reform more than doubled the salary of teachers, and especially benefited teachers in small rural schools who were not able to augment their salary by taking on additional teaching hours.

Table 3: Increase of Teacher Salary Before and After the Structural Reform of 2007 (in MNT)

Category of Teacher	Monthly Salary 2006/2007	Monthly Salary 2007/2008	Monthly Salary 2010/2011	Growth Factor 2006/07 to 2007/08	Growth Factor 2006/07 to 2010/11
1 (1-5 years)	91,588	241,038	298,428	2.63	3.26
2 (6-12 years)	97,628	243,471	301,440	2.49	3.09
3 (13-18 years)	103,669	249,650	309,091	2.41	2.98
4 (19-24 years)	109,710	265,329	328,502	2.41	2.99
5 (25+ years)	115,751	282,819	350,157	2.44	3.02

Source: Decree by the Government of Mongolia, September 5, 2007, Decree #219, and Government Resolution #239 to Renew the Salary Scheme and the Minimum Salary of Public Servants (September 15, 2010).


Table 3 also illustrates the substantial increase in teacher salary that resulted from the structural reform in 2007. The greatest beneficiaries were young teachers, that is, teachers with less than five years of work experience. Their salaries increased by 263 percent from the school year 2006/07 to the school year 2007/08. The Government of Mongolia is continuing to adjust the salaries in the public sector in accordance to inflation, and the most recent salary increase occurred in October 2010.

At present, the starting salary of a school teacher is 298,428 MNT for a weekly work load of 40 hours. Teachers are expected to teach 19 hours per week and use the remaining time for lesson preparation, grading student work, meetings and other work-related tasks. They are paid additionally for extra teaching hours. Furthermore, some teachers are eligible for the following salary supplements: rank supplement (10-20 percent of base salary), classroom teacher (10 percent), cabinet (5 percent), and head of department (5 percent). There are four ranks of teachers: regular teacher, methodologist, leader, and advisor. Regular teachers are not entitled to a rank supplement, and rank supplements only apply to teachers who have been promoted to a higher rank. Teachers at the rank of methodologist receive a salary supplement in the amount of 10 percent of their base salary. The salary supplement is 15 percent for those promoted to the rank of leader and 20 percent for the few teachers who hold the rank of advisor teacher. These days, teachers earn approximately three times more than four years ago, when the teaching load system (*stavka system*) was in place. The average base salary of a teacher is 324,292 MNT or 270 USD. It is important to bear in mind that Table 3 or any other salary table for public sector wages in Mongolia represents only the minimum monthly salaries that an employee is entitled to receive. Employers such as school principals have the option to increase the salary of their employees if their budget permits the increase.

Arguably, the need to substantially raise the teacher salaries was less driven by educational concern than by economic realities. The boom in the private sector made the salary of public servants increasingly unattractive. Beginning in 2005, a concentrated effort was made to raise the salary of public servants and to augment the social benefits attached to public sector jobs. According to estimates of the Ministry of Finance of Mongolia and the World Bank (2007), the public sector salaries in Mongolia exceeded private sector salaries for the first time at the end of 2005. Real salaries in the public sector have risen at an average annual rate of nearly nine percent between 2000 and 2005. In comparison, the salary growth across sectors averaged only approximately five percent during the same time period. Figure 3 reveals the turning point in 2005.

Since the structural teacher salary reform of 2007, the private sector has continued to grow and still attracts teacher education graduates into the business world. However, as Chapter 3 illustrates, there is an oversupply of potential teachers—that is, teacher education institutions produce more teachers than are needed in the teaching workforce. As this study will also demonstrate, three additional types of incentives provided to teachers ensure that they enter the profession and remain in the teaching workforce:

- Job security: regulation of the licensing agreement as well as the revocation of license
- Social benefits for public servants
- Bonus system: three types of bonuses

Figure 3: Comparison between Public and Private Sector Wage Increases in Mongolia, 2000 - 2007

Source: World Bank (2007) *Mongolia Sources of Growth*, p. 11.

1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN

In an attempt to triangulate the data and increase the validity of our findings, we used different data sources, engaged in different levels of analysis, and collected the data from different types of schools.

1.4.1. Types of Information

This UNICEF study collected the following types of information to provide a comprehensive analysis of teacher related issues:

- Composition of teaching workforce (data gathered from EMIS as well as from the interviews)
- Information on pre-service teacher education and on recruitment into teaching
- Regulations and decrees with regard to teacher workload, salary, licensing regulation, in-service training, promotion, bonus systems, etc.
- School-level data on actual teaching load, total teaching pay, in-service training, oversupply/undersupply of teachers, actual bonus payments, etc. (collected from education managers and teachers and from school-level documents)

1.4.2. Sampling of Aimags and Selection of Schools and Interviewees

The study was carried out in Ulaanbaatar as well as in the following five provinces representing the Northern, Eastern, Western, Central and Southern regions of Mongolia: Orkhon, Khentii, Khovd, Arkhangai, and Omnogobi. A total of 28 schools (grades 1-11) were included in the study to represent

three types of schools: city schools, *aimag*-center schools (province-center schools), and *soum*-center schools (district-center schools). The data collection instruments were piloted in April, and the main study was carried out from late April until mid-June. Two schools (Khentii *aimag* and Ulaanbaatar) could not be visited due to bad timing (e.g. during the absence of the principal or during the exam period), so it was decided not to include those two schools in the database. As a result, the database includes 28 schools: nine city schools (Ulaanbaatar, Erdenet), eight *aimag*-center schools, and eleven *soum*-center schools.

We interviewed all available education managers of the 28 schools. Typically, large schools have an education manager for the primary grades and another for the lower and upper secondary grades. Extremely large schools further divide education management by lower and upper secondary schools and/or by subject departments. There were in total 35 education managers who were available for an interview at the day of the visit. In schools that employ more than one education manager, we interviewed all education managers who were available on the day of the visit.

In each school we requested to interview five teachers using purposeful sampling. Thus, we asked the principal or the education manager to help us schedule interviews with two young teachers, two old teachers, and one teacher in the medium age range. In some cases, the teachers filled out the questionnaires on their own, and in a few cases, we conducted in-depth interviews with the teachers using the same questionnaire/interview guide. After the visit to the first four schools in Khentii *aimag* and the first two schools in Ulaanbaatar, we redesigned a few of the items in the teacher questionnaire by replacing open-ended questions with closed-ended questions. In total, 123 teacher questionnaires were entered into an SPSS database. Those questionnaires that were based on the first version (with a greater proportion of open-ended questions) were not entered into the SPSS database, but they were used nevertheless for analysis and interpretation.

In four of the five *aimags*, we were also able to interview the directors or deputy-directors of the Education and Culture Departments. We also met with two representatives of the Capital City Education Department. The map (see Figure 4) with the research sites is presented on the following page. Also, the two standardized questionnaires for our interviews with teachers and education managers are listed in Appendices 1 and 2.

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
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Table 4: List of Selected Schools

#	Name of the <i>aimag</i> and city	<i>Soums</i> and schools
1	Ulaanbaatar	School # 4 city
		School # 24 city
		School # 42 city
		School #44 city
2	Orkhon <i>aimag</i> -Erdenet city	Erdenet complex city
		Naran complex city
		Bayan-Undur complex city
		School #2 city
		School #7 city
3	Khentii <i>aimag</i>	Binder <i>soum</i>
		Jargaltkhaan <i>soum</i>
		Khan-Khentii complex <i>aimag center</i>
		School #2 <i>aimag center</i>
4	Khovd <i>aimag</i>	Tsast-Altai complex <i>aimag center</i>
		School #2 <i>aimag center</i>
		Myangad <i>soum</i>
		Buyant <i>soum</i>
		Mankhan <i>soum</i>
5	Arkhangai <i>aimag</i>	Khumuun complex <i>aimag center</i>
		School #4 <i>aimag center</i>
		Ulziit <i>soum</i>
		Ikhtamir <i>soum</i>
		Khotont <i>soum</i>
		School #1 <i>aimag center</i>
6	Omnogobi <i>aimag</i>	School #3 <i>aimag center</i>
		Bayandalai <i>soum</i>
		Khurmen <i>soum</i>
		Khongor <i>soum</i>

Figure 4: Map of Mongolia with Research Sites



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1.4.3. School-Level Documents

It was additionally important for this study to collect precise, factual information on staffing, teaching hours, salary related issues, composition of the teaching workforce, outcomes contract, bonuses and other information that some education managers or teachers either considered to be delicate information, or for which they did not have the precise answers in hand.

The office of the school principal typically keeps several folders with statistical information, regulations, human resource plans, samples of contracts, and other relevant information. In addition, education managers keep records on teachers' qualifications and the distribution of teaching hours by subject and weekday. The managers also keep on file the outcomes contracts and the different types of bonuses that teachers receive. We either copied relevant documents for this study or, if no copy machine was available or functioning, copied the core information by hand. The following table provided an overview of the available school-level documents that we received from the 28 schools. We also gathered relevant additional documents (e.g., examples of outcomes-based contracts, teachers' evaluation sheets, professional development plans for teachers) from a few schools for purposes of illustration and further clarification.

Table 5: Log of Collected School-Level Documents

Description of the document (N = 28 schools)		
1	Lesson schedule of school by name of teacher & subject	28 schools
2	Lesson plans	6 schools
3	Teachers' teaching hours list	6 schools
4	Number of student's report for the school year	2 schools
5	Number of teachers' report by subjects for the school year	1 school
6	Teachers' information list /personal and professional including number of years worked and professional rank etc.	9 schools
7	Outcome based contract	4 schools
8	School director's decree on allowing teachers' bonus	2 schools
9	Teachers' evaluation sheet	3 schools
10	Teachers' evaluation and bonus allowance sheet	5 schools
11	Professional Development Plan for Teachers over 5 years	2 schools
12	Addition to the lesson plan	1 school
13	Review of lesson schedule	1 school
14	Contract between parents, teacher and students	3 schools

1.5. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

This study used a mixed-methods design and gathered two types of data: quantitative information from data forms (information on teacher qualifications, class schedules, salaries, etc.) and qualitative data from interviews. The combination of quantitative and qualitative data helped the research team to provide factual information, on one hand, and understand the underlying processes, context and reasons

underlying the facts on the other. A major strength of the study was the triangulation of data. The same set of questions was gathered from different sources or was asked of different interviewees to increase the validity of the responses. For example, the section on weekly teaching load or on bonuses was asked of both school administrators and individual teachers at the school, and the answers were compared. Another strength of the research design arose from the selection of 28 schools in five provinces and in Ulaanbaatar that, based on their location and other characteristics, represent the microcosm of schools in Mongolia.

One weakness of the study was the purposeful sampling criterion for teachers. Despite stating the selection criteria upfront and insisting on an undisturbed interview setting, the research team ultimately interviewed whomever the education manager recommended for an interview and used whatever facility was available at the school for the interview with teachers. Thus, teachers selected for the interview were often the ones who either were available on that particular day, or who were particularly articulate with what changes need to be made to improve their own situation and possibly that of their students.

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© A teacher with students, Dashbalbar Soum School, Dornod aimag

CHAPTER 2 THE TEACHING WORKFORCE

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CHAPTER 2: THE TEACHING WORKFORCE

This chapter describes the teaching workforce in schools of Mongolia in terms of gender, teaching experience, qualifications, salary rank, and subject specialization. In addition, the chapter shows the composition of the school staff and reflects on the validity of the statistical information regarding teacher availability or shortage, respectively.

2.1. STAFF IN SCHOOLS

The education sector is comprised of 44,143 persons who work in primary and secondary schools. Of those, roughly sixty percent are teachers. Several observations on the composition of school staff, presented in Table 6, deserve special mention here:

Table 6: Educational and Non-Educational Staff in Schools

	Total	Female	% Female
Educational Staff			
Principals	773	412	53.3
Education Managers	1,295	1,023	79.0
Social Workers	664	455	68.5
Full-Time Teachers	26,358	21,614	82.0
Primary School Teachers	9,059	8,664	95.6
Middle School Teachers	11,061	8,355	75.5
High School Teachers	6,238	4,595	73.7
Part-Time Teachers	887	605	68.2
Class Coordinators	109	79	72.5
Instructional Support Staff	99	72	72.7
Sub-Total	30,185	24,260	80.4
Non-Educational Staff	13,958	8,832	63.3
All Staff: Educational and Non-Educational Staff	44,143	33,092	75.0

Source: MECS 2011 (Statistical Abstract, Table 2.15).

- There is a large number of non-educational staff working in schools; close to one-third of the school staff consists of service staff, guards, firepersons (persons in charge of the heating system), cooks, accountants, dormitory teachers, librarians, physicians, and other professionals who work full-time at the school. Starting with the rationalization reform in 1997, there has been pressure on the education sector to reduce technical support staff. The two-to-one ratio of staff—that is, two educational staff members for every one non-educational staff member—has remained remarkably constant despite external pressures to reduce non-educational staff.
- Regardless of school size, almost every one of the 751 primary and secondary schools in Mongolia has a management team with at least five staff members, including a principal, an education manager (in larger schools: 2 and more education managers), social worker, an accountant, an inventory clerk and, if a school has a dormitory, also a dormitory administrator. In addition,

larger schools employ office clerks and typists.⁸ To control hiring, there exist centrally established regulations; for example, each school must hire a physician for every 1,000 students.

- Over eighty percent of the school staff is female and yet there is no gender parity for the position of school principal. This means, women are under-represented as senior school administrators (notably as school principals), as compared to lower administrative or teaching positions.

2.2. GENDER, TEACHING EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATION


Gender: The teaching profession is predominantly female. As Table 6 demonstrates, women comprise almost 96 percent of the teaching workforce in primary schools. The proportion of female teachers drops in lower and upper secondary school but women nevertheless represent three-quarters of all teachers at post-primary level.

Teaching Experience: The teaching workforce is remarkably young: 30.6 percent of all teachers have worked for five years or less in schools. In September 2010, 1,171 new teachers were hired. In contrast to this large group of new and young teachers, only 14.4 percent or 3,809 teachers have more than 25 years of work experience. The rejuvenation of the teaching workforce is predominantly a result of the expansion of general education, first from 10 to 11 years in 2004/05 and then from 11 to 12 years of schooling in 2008/09. The expansion required the employment of a greater number of teachers, in great part recruited from pre-service teacher education graduates.

Qualifications: According to statistical information from MECS, only 175 teachers out of a total of 26,358 teachers are unqualified teachers. This amounts to 0.7 percent of the teaching workforce. There has been in a significant boom in teacher education studies over the past ten years. There are currently numerous public and private universities that provide diplomas and bachelor's degrees. A few of them, however, are diploma mills or issue degrees with little recognition in the market place. Figure 5 demonstrates that the number of qualified teachers increased over the past 15 years from 87.9 percent to 99.3 percent. In the same period, the number of enrollments in higher education quadrupled from 44,088 to 170,126. The eradication of the category "unqualified teachers"—currently at a low of 0.7 percent—does not necessarily imply that the quality of teachers has improved. There is significant public concern about the large number of diplomas and degrees that are considered of limited value in the labor market, yet cost a lot to obtain. With the exception of the large teacher education programs, mostly based at public universities, there is no direct link between qualification and the quality of teachers. The high number of statistically qualified teachers masks the reality that many so-called qualified teachers have obtained a second-class pre-service teacher education.

⁸ In the academic year 2010-2011, there were 669 accountants, 660 inventory clerks and dormitory administrators, and 362 office clerks and typists (Statistical Abstract, 2011).

Figure 5: Qualified Teachers (in %) and Enrollment in Higher Education (in '000), 1996 - 2011



The majority of the current teaching workforce holds a bachelor’s degree (64.9 percent), followed by teachers with a diploma (23.2 percent). It is remarkable that a relatively large number (10.7 percent of the teaching workforce) already hold the new master’s degree. The remaining teachers pursue other types of qualifications; amongst those who do, twenty-one out of 26,358 teachers hold a doctoral degree.

2.3. RANK AND PROMOTION OF TEACHERS

There are four professional qualifications or salary ranks: regular teacher, methodologist, lead teacher, and advisor teacher. The salary supplements, paid as a percentage of the base salary, and the conditions for promotion are listed in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Criteria for Promotion

Rank/Title	SUP	Qualifications			
		Student outcomes	Workshops	Credits/Devel.	Research Project
1 Advisor Teacher	20%	10% higher than the national average	Moderates workshops at national level	Accumulated 10 credits of prof. develop.	Conducted research at the national level
2 Lead Teacher	15%	5% higher than the national average	Moderates workshops at <i>aimag/city</i> level	Accumulated 8 credits of prof. develop.	Conducted research at the <i>aimag/city</i> level
3 Methodologist Teacher	10%	Not lower than the national average	Moderates workshops at <i>soum</i> level	Accumulated 5 credits of prof. development	Conducted research at the <i>soum</i> level
4 Regular Teacher	0%				

After five years, regular teachers can apply for promotion to the rank of methodologist teacher if they fulfill the following requirements:

- the performance of their students must not be lower than the national average;
- they must have moderated workshops on curriculum development at the *soum* or district level;
- they must have taken professional development training on educational studies, subject matter specific courses, and teaching methods; and
- they must have conducted research on teacher development, submitted standards, and curricula for their subjects and must have presented and published their research.

As the example illustrates, the requirements are quite specific with regard to the topics of the workshops, professional development courses, and research. The promotion criteria represent a combination of (student) performance, training capacity, professional development, and reflexive practice (applied research).

Not surprisingly, the universities that offer professional development courses and recruit workshop moderators have directly benefited financially from these promotion requirements. They have benefited twice-over—that is, from the recruitment of course moderators and from the enrollment of course participants. The City Education Department, for example, recruits mostly teachers at the rank of advisor teacher to work as workshop moderators for credit-bearing in-service teacher training courses offered in Ulaanbaatar.

There has been a boom in self-financed professional development courses because there is a high private return on the investment; namely, teachers accumulate credit in the expectation that they will be promoted to a higher rank. The interviews with teachers conducted for this study, however, seem to suggest that there is a “professional development fatigue” among the teachers. That is, several interviewed teachers were disappointed because they were not promoted to a higher rank, despite their enrollment and out-of-pocket investment in professional development courses. As Chapter 6 will show, they also found many of the courses unworthy of investment and reported that there is currently too much pressure to take professional development courses.

It is important to bear in mind that the salary supplements, listed above, only determine the intervals between the four salary ranks and represent minimum supplements that must be given to teachers holding the respective rank. Depending on the school budget, schools may choose to pay higher supplements to teachers with a professional rank.

There are three important developments that may be summarized as follows: over the past five years, promotion to the highest rank has become virtually impossible (fewer teachers are promoted to the rank of advisor teacher); the rural-urban divide with regard to rank supplement has decreased to a bare minimum; and the nominal value of salary supplements has increased (from 5-15 percent to 10-20 percent now). These three observations are explained in greater detail next.

First, the pyramid in the professional qualifications of teachers has become slightly narrower over time: in 2009/10, only 1.3 percent of all teachers (342 teachers) held the rank of advisor teacher advisor. Three years earlier, their number was 500. The vast majority of lead teachers have not yet been promoted to

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the title of advisor teacher. Moreover, slightly less than half of the teachers (47.1 percent) are currently at the lowest professional rank, that is, they are regular teachers without a salary supplement. The large number of regular teachers who await promotion to the next rank of methodologist teacher reflects the disproportionately large number of young teachers in Mongolia. Figure 6 compares the salary ranks over the past three years.

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
Second, according to the new official definition of “rural” versus “urban” schools, the urban-rural gap has significantly narrowed over the past five years.⁹ In the current terminology of MECS, all schools outside of Ulaanbaatar are considered rural. According to the current definition used by MECS, all *aimags* including those with the second and third largest cities of Mongolia (Erdenet and Darkhan) are also considered rural. The proportion of teachers with a professional qualification (a rank that is above the rank of regular teacher) is higher in Orkhon and Darkhan than in Ulaanbaatar. In both cities, approximately 62 percent of all teachers have professional qualifications. In contrast, the ratio of teachers with professional qualifications amounts to only 48 percent in Ulaanbaatar. Curiously, Orkhon (city Erdenet) and Darkhan-Uul (city Darkhan) are considered to be rural *aimags*. As a result, the schools in the two cities and also those in other *aimag*-center schools distort the results, because they increase the average ratio of teachers with professional qualifications. If the EMIS data would assign the schools in *aimag*-centers to a separate category (“semi-urban” or “semi-rural”), the average values of schools in rural areas would be much lower. The new categorization used in EMIS is problematic for those interested in analyzing peripheral and marginalized schools within provinces.

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Figure 6: Salary Ranks in 2006/07 and 2009/2010



Source: EMIS data

It is currently impossible to identify differences between rural and remote rural schools or between *aimag*-center and *soum*-center schools. The change in methodology imposes serious limitations on comparison over time, and these distinctions need to be kept in mind when interpreting the data. In 2004/05, there were three times as many lead teachers in Ulaanbaatar and in the province-center schools as there were in district-centers and villages. In the same vein, the number of teachers without any rank supplement was double in rural schools as compared to schools in Ulaanbaatar and *aimag*-

⁹ The EMIS 2009/2010 and EMIS 2010/2011 distinguish between Ulaanbaatar (“urban”) and the rest of the country (“rural”), whereas the PETS Mongolia study also included *aimag*-center schools in the category “urban schools.” In line with EMIS categorizations of the time, the PETS Mongolia study only considered *soum*-center and *bagh* schools as “rural” schools and thus excluded *aimag*-center schools.

center schools.¹⁰ By the academic year 2009/2010, the rural-urban gap [using the new terminology] nearly disappeared; the percentage of teachers with professional qualifications (methodologist teachers, lead teachers, and advisor teachers) was 49.6 percent in Ulaanbaatar and 45.9 percent in schools outside of the capital. The reasons for the rural-urban divide were well studied in the PETS Mongolia study, which found that there was a correlation between teaching experience and promotion. Schools in urban areas managed to attract experienced teachers from rural areas, and therefore, the ratio of teachers with professional qualifications was much higher in urban schools. In addition, the chances of fulfilling the promotion criteria were bigger in urban schools, because those teachers had easier access to professional development courses, and the reviewers were in closer geographic proximity. A promotion from the rank of regular teacher to methodologist requires, for example, a review by the school administration, and the Education and Culture Department at the provincial level merely needs to be informed. For the next level—promotion from methodologist to lead teacher—the ECD methodologists review the teacher’s portfolio and observe the teacher’s class. Finally, for the highest rank—promotion from lead teacher to advisor teacher—reviewers from the central level, based in Ulaanbaatar, must carry out the promotion review. Over the past five years, the promotion review criteria have remained the same, but the number of professional development courses offered throughout the country has significantly increased. The spread of professional development courses has improved equity throughout the country, and the rural-urban divide with regard to professional qualifications has almost completely disappeared (if the new official definition of rural and urban schools is applied).¹¹

Thirdly, as part of the structural salary reform, the rank supplements were increased by five percent for each rank. Before 2007, teachers at the rank of methodologist earned only five percent of their base salary in terms of salary supplement. Similarly, the supplement for lead teachers was ten percent and the one for advisor teacher was fifteen percent.¹²

Taken together, these three trends have important implications for teacher-related policies. For example, lead teachers may soon experience a sense of having a “glass ceiling” if the quota for promotions to the highest salary level is not substantially lifted. One of the greatest concerns, uncovered in the PETS Mongolia study in 2006, has to do with the unequal promotion chances of teachers in rural, semi-urban, and urban schools. In the five years since the study was completed, the professional development opportunities in rural schools have visibly increased, but the statistical analyses are inconclusive as to whether the rural-urban divide has really disappeared, due to the terminological changes that were applied to the definitions of rural and urban schools.

2.4. SUBJECT SPECIALIZATIONS

The number of part-time teachers is very small: only 3.2 percent of the teachers (887 teachers) work part-time. In contrast, 26,358 teachers work full-time. Full-time work is seen as a right of the employee. The same applies for teachers who are entitled to full-time work (unless the teacher is a retired professional). Even professionals who are hired as teachers for subjects that experience teacher shortage—or for subjects with only a few weekly instructional hours (English, information technology, physical education, music and fine arts)—are encouraged to work full-time. Teachers hired part-time only as exceptions.¹³

¹⁰ World Bank. (2006). *Mongolia. Public Financing of Education. Equity and Efficiency Implications* [also referred to as PETS Mongolia study]. Washington, DC: World Bank.

¹¹ The problematic change in terminology cannot be overstated: the currently used, official methodology for defining “rural schools” masks the vast differences between *soum*-center schools and *aimag*-center schools.

¹² Joint Order # 328/131/283 of Ministers of Education, Culture and Science, Social Security and Labor, and Finance; see also the well-research background report of the Finance and Economic Department, MECS (2007). *Salary Structure of General Education School Teachers*. Ulaanbaatar: February 2007.

¹³ See Joint Order #307/91/237 of the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, the Minister of Social Protection and Labor and the Minister of Finance, August 31, 2007.

Teacher training institutions provide credit-bearing courses for higher education graduates who teach without a proper teacher education degree. This “specialization conversion” training consists of specialized courses in teaching methods or didactics. Like any new teacher, these teachers have to undergo a certification process and only receive the teaching license after one year, when the course work in didactics has been completed and the teacher has gained experience in teaching the particular subject(s). The same procedure applies for teachers who wish to change their area of specialization; that is, they have to enroll in didactics courses in the particular subject(s) and also teach the new subject(s) at least for one year before getting licensed in the new subject(s).¹⁴

Table 8: Primary and Secondary School Teachers by Subject Area in 2010/2011

Subject	Total	Subject	Total	Subject	Total
Primary school subjects	9,059	Mongolian language & literature	2,039	Kazakh language	53
Russian language	710	English language	2,130	Russian & English	458
Other foreign language	190	Computer & information	543	Math	1,672
Math & informatics	282	Math & physics	285	Physics	749
Chemistry	560	Chemistry & biology	350	Biology	622
History	444	History & social study	728	Social study	220
History & geography	169	Geography	546	Physical education	1,698
Music	764	Arts and Drafts	271	Drawing & technology	595
Technology	963	Pedagogy & psychology	14	Defectology	30
Speech correction	9	Social worker	16	Other	189
Total: 26,358					

Source: *Statistical Abstract (2011), Table 2.17.*

The wide variety of subject teachers, manifested in Table 8, is somewhat confusing. These data do not reflect the qualifications of teachers, but rather the subject(s) a teacher is teaching. At MSUE, for example, teachers are trained to teach two subjects (e.g., biology and chemistry). The exception is math; math teachers are by training single-subject teachers. All other teachers trained at MSUE are licensed to teach two subjects even though they may end up, as Table 8 shows, teaching one subject only (the situation may differ in other teacher training institutions). In 2006, MECS introduced a compelling five-year pilot project (MECS Ministerial Order #236) that prepared future natural science teachers in multiple science subjects. Apart from this pilot project that focused on subject areas or multi-subject teaching, teacher education students are typically trained to teach two subjects (again, with the exception of math).

Regionally, there is clearly a trend towards multi-subject, pre-service teacher education. As a result of curriculum reform throughout Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and Asia, teachers in most countries now prepare for a subject area (e.g., natural sciences) rather than an individual subject (e.g., chemistry, physics, geography) with areas of specialization within a subject. This enables teachers to easily change their subject specialization over the course of their career. Multi-subject preparation is also advantageous for the educational sector, as it enables schools to hire teachers who are qualified and licensed to teach several subjects. As a result of multi-subject pre-service teacher education, teachers do not have to teach

¹⁴ For details, see Ministerial Order #74, November 13, 2008, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science of Mongolia, section 2.5.

substitute subjects only to fulfill the requirement of a full teaching load of 19 hours per week. Instead, they are able to teach the two or three subjects for which they have received the degree or license.

Similar to other countries in the region, Mongolia embarked on a curriculum reform in 2006 that aimed at integrating several subjects into a subject area. The new curriculum enabled students to select an elective and study that subject in greater depth after having learned the fundamentals in a more broadly defined subject area. In 2011, the reform of 2006 was revoked and single subjects (e.g., biology, chemistry physics) were re-introduced at secondary level. A closer examination reveals that the integration of subjects only took place in urban settings. Schools in rural areas continued with teaching single subjects and, in effect, skipped the 2006 reform.

Even now, preferences for single over integrated subjects are divided. At one end of the spectrum are Mongolian experts who promote multi-subject teaching in pre-service teacher education for all the reasons listed above. Equally strong, however, are opponents of multi-subject training. Their argument is related to the university entrance exam (that only tests applicants in individual subjects rather than in subject areas) as well as the academic rigor required for being an effective teacher. The discussion on depth versus breadth is not unique to Mongolia. It is a long-standing discussion, and educational systems tend to go back and forth on the question of how many subjects a future teacher is supposed to be able to teach. The debate in other educational systems, however, is over whether future teachers should be prepared to teach two or more than two subjects. None of the OECD countries prepare teachers for one subject only, because there is a high likelihood of that teacher taking on teaching hours in non-specialized subjects, especially in smaller schools. Nevertheless, the demand for teaching one subject only is a recurrent theme in Mongolia and in Central Asia and resurfaces every few years. To some extent, the single-subject camp has mainly the teachers in the city and *aimag*-center schools in mind who are indeed able to teach a full teaching load in their subjects only. In *soum*-center schools and smaller *aimag*-center schools, teachers tend to teach two or more subjects, even though they are only prepared to teach one or two subjects.

2.5. TEACHER AVAILABILITY AND SHORTAGE

In 2010/2011, there were 26,457 full-time teaching positions needed.¹⁵ Of those positions, 26,358 were filled, amounting to an availability rate of 99.6 percent, or a teacher shortage of 0.4 percent, respectively. Statistically, teacher shortage is virtually non-existent in Mongolia. However, as numerous other UNICEF studies on teachers have shown,¹⁶ statistical averages mask the extent of real teacher shortage for a variety of reasons: for example, schools cope with the shortage of qualified teachers in a given subject by filling the position with unqualified or under-qualified substitute teachers. The statistical figure on teacher shortage thus only captures the posts that, despite the coping strategies mentioned above, could not be filled at the beginning of the school year. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, there are ten different coping strategies at the school level that ultimately falsely represent a lack of teacher shortage when statistics are reported. Many of these strategies, however, have a detrimental effect on the quality of teaching. The following coping strategies are very common in the CEECIS region (Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States) and particularly in the Central Asian countries (notably, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan):

¹⁵ Statistical Abstract (2011), Table 2.16.

¹⁶ See, in particular, UNICEF CEECIS. (2011). *Teachers: A Regional Study on Recruitment, Development and Salaries of Teachers in the CEECIS Region*. Geneva: UNICEF CEECIS.

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- Hiring correspondence students with incomplete higher education who work part-time as teachers
- Re-hiring retired teachers
- Redistributing teaching hours: assigning additional teaching hours to teachers in subjects for which they have no training or license
- Hiring professionals without a teacher education degree (“unqualified teachers”)
- Accumulating teaching hours: assigning excessive teaching loads to teachers – 27-35 hours/week
- Attracting qualified teachers who have another main source of income (farming, trade, private sector, etc.) to work for a few hours at school (“part-time teachers”)

This study examined whether latent teacher shortage—in the form of hiring substitute teachers—also occurs in Mongolia. The findings will be presented in Chapter 6 of this report.

2.6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most important findings of this chapter are summarized in the following:

- (1) **Composition of school staff:** Close to one-third of the school staff is either working in school administration or acts as support staff. School-based management and per capita financing was introduced in 1998. This explains why every school has a management team that consists of at least five members, regardless of school size: a principal, an education manager, a social worker, an accountant, and an inventory clerk and dormitory administrator. Despite external pressure to reduce non-educational staff over the past ten years, the two-to-one ratio of staff to non-educational staff has remained remarkably constant.
- (2) **Gender:** Almost 96 percent of the teaching workforce is female, with a slightly higher proportion of male teachers working at lower and upper secondary school and a much higher representation of men in school administration.
- (3) **Teaching experience and age:** The teaching workforce is remarkably young, as 30.6 percent of all teachers have worked in schools for five years or less.
- (4) **Qualifications:** According to statistical information from MECS, only 0.7 percent of teachers are currently unqualified. The proportion of unqualified teachers has diminished visibly over the past fifteen years. In 1996/97, the ratio of unqualified teachers was 12.1 percent of the teaching workforce. A closer examination, however, reveals a quadrupled expansion of higher education in the period 1996/97 to 2010/2011. Thus, the eradication of the category “unqualified teachers” does not necessarily imply that the quality of teachers has improved to the same extent as the increase in number of degree holders. A significant number of the small, private teacher education institutions are merely degree mills, while licensing programs do exist but do not necessarily help to improve the quality of teaching.
- (5) **Rank and promotion:** Approximately half of the teachers are currently in the lowest rank as regular teachers; this reflects to some extent the young age of the teaching workforce in

Mongolia. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly difficult to become promoted to a higher rank over the past few years, especially to the rank of lead teacher and advisor teacher.

- (6) **Subject specializations:** There are at least 29 registration codes for subject specializations. This large variety of subject specializations reflects the change in pre-service teacher education curriculum. The education sector now employs teachers who are licensed in two subjects such as chemistry and biology, as well as single subject teachers (e.g., chemistry teachers, biology teachers).
- (7) **Teacher availability and shortage:** Teacher availability is 99.6 percent, that is, teacher shortage is only 0.4 percent. Statistically, teacher shortage is virtually non-existent in Mongolia. However, it is important to understand a compellingly simple yet understudied phenomenon of teacher shortage: the statistically reported figure for teacher shortage reflects the number of positions that a school was not able to fill by the beginning of the school year despite a series of coping mechanisms such as re-hiring retired teachers, asking teachers to take on additional hours, and/or hiring part-time teachers or correspondence students. Chapter 6 will examine whether or not this type of latent or hidden teacher shortage does indeed exist in Mongolia.

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CHAPTER 3 RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING

CHAPTER 3: RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING

Chapter 3 introduces a core concept in teacher education studies that measures the effectiveness of pre-service teacher education: recruitment into teaching. This concept is reflected in the flagship pre-service teacher education programs of MSUE, and this chapter compares recruitment into teaching in Mongolia with the effectiveness of pre-service teacher education in a high-performing educational system (Singapore) as well as with a low-performing educational system (Kyrgyzstan).

3.1. THE EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN MONGOLIA

The explosive growth of higher education in Mongolia, as well as the problems associated with it, has been sufficiently documented in other studies.¹⁷ From 1992 to 2007, enrollment increased more than six-fold. Most of the private tertiary institutions are not accredited, but regardless of their accreditation status, they manage to attract students and charge on average \$300 per year tuition. Since higher education institutions are tuition-driven, they offer degree programs that are cheap in delivery but not necessarily high in demand on the labor market. For example, there is an undersupply of science and technology graduates; both are fields that are costly for universities to offer due to expensive laboratory equipment and other costs. According to the World Bank *Mongolia Higher Education Policy Note*, only 36 percent of university graduates have been able to find a job, compared with 60 percent of graduates from technical and vocational education programs. Also, the chances of finding a job are greater for graduates from public universities. Finally, due to inefficient financing in higher education, the tuition fees are extremely high and many parents, especially from rural areas, are not able to enroll their children in higher education. According to the World Bank study, herders spend 67 percent of their personal loans on tertiary education.

The situation has changed drastically in recent times. As a result of economic growth and political promises, funding for higher education students has undergone a major increase. Last year, the Government of Mongolia transferred 500,000 MNT to each student in higher education institutions from the so-called Human Development Fund to be used for tuition, in addition to providing scholarships for special groups; this is the same fund that also supplies each citizen with 21,000 MNT per month. In the academic year of 2011/12, the program is likely to continue, as it is a part of the promise the Government of Mongolia made during the election year to “give out 1,5 mln MNT to each citizen.” Financial support for higher education is one of the two possible ways of receiving the “promised” allowance. The other way is using it against the loans to purchase apartments/housing. Recently, the President announced the introduction of an additional stipend (70,000 MNT per month) for students at higher education institutions. However, it is still not clear whether all students will receive the stipend or whether it is tied to the academic performance of the student. In addition to state funds, there are also private funds for higher education students.¹⁸


Figure 7 presents the enrollment figures for bachelor’s programs. The programs in the social sciences,

¹⁷ See, for example, World Bank. (2010). *Tertiary Education in Mongolia. Meeting the Challenges of the Global Economy. Mongolia Higher Education Policy Note*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

¹⁸ Besides the government scholarships, private companies and businesses (mostly banks and mining companies) have their own scholarship programs. These programs seem to be more targeted in that they try to seek out to fund students in the programs related to their business or students from their target area. For instance, Oyu Tolgoi LLC has a scholarship program for undergraduate students from Omnogobi *aimag*.

business and law have the highest numbers of students enrolled (current figures put enrollment at 52,323 students). The degree programs for engineering, manufacturing and processing, and architecture and civil engineering rank second in popularity. In 2010/11, there were 20,989 students enrolled in teacher training at the bachelor's level. In the same year, however, only 1,171 teachers were newly hired. Thus, there is clearly an oversupply of qualified teachers who are not absorbed by the labor market. Nevertheless, teacher education studies are very popular, as the proportion of pre-service teacher education students as a percentage of all undergraduate students is large, and every seventh bachelor's degree student (or 13.8 percent) of all undergraduate students (N=151,612) is enrolled in teacher training.

Figure 7: Bachelor's Degree Students by Fields of Study



Source: *Statistical Abstract (2011), Table 4.18.*

The bachelor's degree program in administration and management attracts the greatest number of students (32,265 students) and constitutes one of the degree programs offered in the social sciences, business and law departments. As mentioned above, there is a much greater demand in the science and technology fields of study than are currently offered. This is due to the high delivery cost and the more selective admission criteria.

The exponential growth of higher education has been especially pronounced in educational studies. In 2004, bachelor's degree students in teacher education represented 7.3 percent of the total body of undergraduate students. Six years later, the ratio of teacher education students as a percentage of all bachelor students nearly doubled. Today, teacher education students (20,989) make up 13.8 percent of all students enrolled in bachelor's programs. There was a hike in enrollment in academic year 2007/08 when teacher salaries were significantly raised (see Chapter 1), and the demand for teachers had grown due to the extension of general education started from 10 to 11, and later on, from 11 to 12 years.

3.2. THE MONGOLIAN STATE UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION

Out of the 20,989 bachelor's students enrolled in teacher education studies across the country, there were 11,100, or 53%, enrolled in MSUE; 68 percent of them (7,752 students) are women. The lower percentage of female students enrolled in university, compared to the percentage in the teaching workforce is noticeable, and this interesting phenomenon is addressed later in the report. Due to the high percentage of students enrolled in teacher education in MSUE, this study focuses on MSUE and leaves aside the numerous other teacher education programs.¹⁹

In the academic year 2010/2011, 27.8 percent of the MSUE students received government scholarships from the State Training Fund and the remaining students were self-financed. Similarly to degree programs in other higher education institutions, the two largest groups of scholarship recipients were children of government employees (1,108 students) and poor children or children of herder families (1,347 students). In addition, 639 students received a government loan. Loans are supposed to be repaid within ten years. Graduates who work consecutively in the public sector for eight years, including five years in a rural area, are exempt from repaying the loan. However, the repayment policy is not rigorously enforced and the Government periodically forgives all outstanding loans.

MSUE has two campuses for the bachelor's program: Ulaanbaatar with 9,434 students, enrolled in twelve different departments, and Arkhangai with 1,666 students. The Arkhangai campus only offers primary teacher education. Table 9 presents the twelve departments of MSUE that are offered in the Ulaanbaatar campus.

Table 9: Enrollment in Mongolian State University of Education by Departments

	Department	Enrollment
1	Mathematics and statistics	867
2	Physics and technology	546
3	Educational studies	459
4	History and social science	718
5	Foreign language	940
6	Illustration technology school	673
7	Mongolian studies	829
8	Natural science	1,083
9	Computer and information technology (IT)	573
10	Sports and physical education	820
11	Primary teacher education	1,418
12	Preschool teacher education	508
13	Arkhangai Primary Teacher Education	1,666
TOTAL		11,100

Source: MSUE (2011).


¹⁹ We would like to thank Professor A.Tsog-Ochir, Vice-President for Training and Cooperation and Professor D.Tsedevsuren, Manager of Bachelor, Academic Affairs for providing us the statistical information presented in this section of the report.

It is noticeable that the Department of Natural Sciences (1,083 enrollments) and Department of Mathematics and Statistics (867 enrollments) are the two largest departments among the secondary school departments. This possibly explains why there is no shortage of teachers in natural sciences and math in Mongolia when compared to other countries. There is a dramatic global shortage of math and science teachers, but for a variety of reasons, this is not the case in Mongolia. In fact, this situation deserves more in-depth examination as Mongolia represents a “best practice” with regard to recruitment into teaching for math and science teachers.²⁰

3.3. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-SERVICE TEACHER EDUCATION

The concept of “recruitment into teaching” measures the quality and the effectiveness of pre-service teacher education.²¹ It is necessary to briefly explain the concept before applying it to the Mongolian State University of Education. Recruitment into teaching covers the entire cycle from the moment school graduates apply to pre-service teacher education to the moment they accept a teaching position and decide to stay in the profession. Figure 8 presents the various stages that, taken together, constitute recruitment into teaching.

Figure 8: The Cycle of Recruitment into Teaching



Several research questions arise when the full cycle is examined. For example:

- Who applies to pre-service teacher education, who chooses to accept a position as a teacher, and who stays in the profession?
- How difficult/easy is it to be admitted to pre-service teacher education as compared to other degree programs in higher education?
- How selective is admission into pre-service teacher education?

²⁰ Two possible reasons were put forward to us: First, the gender bias in math and science is not as pronounced in Mongolia as it is in other countries where fewer girls enroll in these subjects. Second, natural sciences are not presented as electives in upper secondary school but are mandatory subjects. Third, math and science teachers are highly respected making the study of these subjects socially valuable.

²¹ See also UNICEF CEEICIS Study on Teachers (2011).

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- How many admitted teacher education students “survive” to the end of their studies?
- Of those who complete their degree, how many accept a teaching position and, of these, how many indeed show up at the assigned school?

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- Finally, 2-5 years later: how many of the newly qualified teachers are still working in the profession?

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The following five indicators characterize effective teacher education, that is, they represent the ideal scenario with regard to recruitment into teaching:

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- (1) **Selective and targeted admission.** Ideally, applicants would be carefully reviewed and only those with a strong educational background (high test scores) and a high motivation for teacher education are admitted.

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- (2) **Congruence between admission and enrollment.** Ideally, those who have been admitted would also enroll in the teacher education program. It is assumed that there would be a high yield because the “right” applicants would be chosen, namely, applicants that considered teacher education their first choice.

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- (3) **Nearly universal completion or survival rate.** An effective teacher education program would ensure that all students (with a few exceptions due to illness, migration, pregnancy, etc.) complete the bachelor’s program within the four-year study period. In other words, students would not be held back or made to repeat a year, and consequently, students would not switch to other degree programs after having been admitted to the teacher education program.

- (4) **High university-to-work transition rate.** In an effective teacher education system, most graduates would become teachers. Thus, the university-to-work transition rate should be close to 100 percent or at least very high. A high transition rate also would imply that the teacher education studies would not represent a general higher education degree, but were instead particularly geared towards the teaching profession.

- (5) **High retention rate of newly qualified teachers.** Effective teacher education systems would apply some type of licensing scheme for the first one or two years of professional practice, and would also induct the newly qualified teachers into the profession by means of mentoring and other types of support. As a result, very few newly qualified teachers would quit the profession. The retention rate would then be typically measured two or five years after completion of the teacher education studies.

Recruitment into teaching has become an important approach to studying the effectiveness of pre-service teacher education. Besides the UNICEF studies mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report, the concept has also been highlighted in OECD and World Bank studies, and has been popularized in the two McKinsey reports on education.²²

²² See OECD. (2005). *Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing, and Retaining Effective Teachers*. Paris: OECD; for World Bank, see SABER-Teachers, posted on the website of the World Bank. For McKinsey see: McKinsey & Co. (2007). *How the Best Performing School Systems Came Out on Top*. London: McKinsey & Co. and McKinsey Report (2010). *Closing the talent gap: Attracting and retaining top third graduates to a career in teaching*. London: McKinsey & Company.

3.4. RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING IN MONGOLIA: THE CASE OF MSUE

It is important to bear in mind that out of all pre-service teacher education institutions in Mongolia, MSUE represents the most established and renowned university in the field of teacher education studies. Thus, recruitment into teaching at MSUE would most likely be more effective than in other universities, both public and private.

A few methodological comments on how we applied recruitment into teaching to MSUE may be in order here. From the twelve departments of MSUE, we collected information on the following three departments that represent the wide variety of teacher education programs in terms of popularity and selectivity:

- Primary teacher education
- Secondary teacher education: Department of Foreign Languages
- Secondary teacher education: Department of Mongolian Language and Literature

The following information was analyzed over the following five academic years from 2006/07 until 2010/11:

- Number of students who took the teacher education admission test for the particular department
- Number of students who were accepted into the department
- Number of students who enrolled in the department
- Number of students who completed the degree program in four years

Two important types of information were unavailable: university/work transition rate and retention rate after two or five years of professional service. EMIS provided information on the number of first year teachers in the country, and based on that information, we were able to estimate how many of the MSUE graduates chose to become teachers. It was impossible, however, to project how many of the newly qualified teachers would remain at the teaching post two or five years after their graduation. Based on our interviews in 28 schools, we assumed a high retention rate, with very few leaving the profession during the first few years of their work.

In the following sections, four indicators for recruitment into teaching were applied to assess the quality and effectiveness of the teacher education programs at MSUE: admission rate, enrollment rate, completion rate, and transition rate.

3.4.1. Admission Rate

The different test scores required for admission to the twelve academic departments vary widely. From the three departments that were analyzed in this study, the Department of Foreign Languages has the

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most rigorous admission criteria and enrolls students who perform better academically than in the other two departments. In the academic year 2010/11, the average test score for admitted students in the Department of Foreign Languages was 710 points, as opposed to 550 points in primary teacher education, and 584 in the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature.

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
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A second finding relates to changes over time: it has become more difficult to pass the admission test and be accepted into teacher education. The required admission scores were approximately the same in the academic year 2006/07, when each of these departments required a test score between 520 and 540 points. In all three examined fields of study, the required admission score has subsequently been raised. The huge gap in test scores between the Department of Foreign Languages and the other departments, presented in Figure 9, is a recent phenomenon and reflects the popularity of foreign language studies at MSUE.

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Figure 9: Average Test Scores for Admitted Students at MSUE in 2006/2007 and 2010/2011



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Source: MSUE database.

The admission rate reflects the percentage of applicants who were accepted or admitted to the department at MSUE. In the Department for Primary Teacher Education, the figures for the number of applicants and the number of admitted students are identical. In other words, there was no additional selection or screening of applicants taking place. All of the 348 applicants to the Department of Primary Teacher Education were accepted and subsequently enrolled into the degree program.

The situation is different for applicants in the Department of Foreign Languages and the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature. In the Department of Foreign Languages, 93 percent were admitted (218 students admitted out of 234 applicants) and in the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature, the admission rate was over four times lower at only 19.7 percent, as 380 students took the admission test but only 75 of them were admitted. The threshold for applying to the Mongolian Language and Literature Department is lower because applicants feel more confident taking the test in their native language rather than in one of the foreign languages. This explains why there is such a large number of applications (380 students) in the Mongolian Language and Literature Department. However, it is not entirely clear why only 75 applicants were admitted in the Mongolian Language and Literature Department, as opposed to 234 applicants in the Foreign Language Department. It may be that the


large number of admitted students in the Foreign Language Department has to do with the various units within the Department that conduct their own classes in English, Russian, Chinese, German, French, Korean, or Japanese language teaching.

3.4.2. Enrollment Rate

The enrollment rate, measured in terms of the ratio of those who were admitted to those who actually enrolled, is irrelevant in the context of Mongolia. Students who were accepted are automatically enrolled in the degree program. Even though this particular indicator is widely used in other countries, it does not provide any relevant information about the determination of applicants to actually enroll in teacher education studies. For example, all of the 348 students who were accepted into the Department of Teacher Education also enrolled in that degree program (see Table 10). The same pattern applies to the other two departments that were examined in detail: the number of enrolled students is identical to the number of admitted students.

As mentioned earlier, the Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) program in education experienced a surge in enrollment in 2006/07 and 2007/08 (not only at MSUE but also countrywide) as a result of major reforms in the education sector, notably the expansion of general education and the improvement of teacher salaries. In 2004/05, B.A. students in teacher education accounted for 7.3 percent of students in all B.A. programs (N=11,167). Six years later, in 2010/11, every seventh B.A. student (13.8 percent) was a student enrolled in teacher education.

Figure 10: Enrollment in B.A. in Education Programs, All Universities, 2004-2010



Sources: EMIS data.

3.4.3 Completion Rate

The completion rate was calculated by comparing the number of students who enrolled in the academic year 2006/07 with the number of students who completed their studies four years later in 2009/10. Similarly, the completion or survival rate for the academic year 2010/11 was obtained by comparing the number of students who were admitted in 2007/08 with the number of students who graduated from

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the program four years later, that is, in 2010/11. Table 10 presents the information on enrollment and graduation that served as a foundation to compute the completion rates.

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For example, there were 196 students enrolled in primary teacher education in 2006/07, and 176 of them graduated four years later in 2009/10 (see Table 10). The completion rate for this cohort of primary teacher education students is 89.7 percent. The completion rates vary by department; students in the Department of Foreign Languages have a significantly lower completion rate (70.1 percent) than students in the other two departments (around 90 percent). There was a sudden drop in the completion rate in the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature in the academic year 2010/2011 that deserves further scrutiny.

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3.4.4. Transition Rate

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The most surprising finding relates to the transition rate, that is, the percentage of graduates who actually take on a teaching position at a school.

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In the school year 2010/2011, only 1,171 teachers were newly hired.²³ This stands in stark contrast to the approximately 5,000 students who graduated in that year from pre-service teacher education programs. In other words, on average only 23.4 percent of teacher education graduates become teachers. The remaining 3,829 graduates find other non-educational positions, re-apply for teaching positions in the following year, or remain unemployed. The transition rate of 23.4 percent is much lower than the general transition rate provided for all bachelor programs. The World Bank *Higher Education Policy Note* identified a transition rate of 36 percent for higher education programs for the year 2006 (World Bank, 2010). The transition rate has improved over the past four years and now stands at 40 percent.

TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF TEACHERS

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It is important to point out that the MSUE graduates have a much higher rate of employment than graduates from teacher education studies offered at private or smaller higher education institutions. MSUE graduates are considered, along with graduates from other large universities (National University of Mongolia and Institute of Humanities), as the most marketable graduates in the labor market for teachers. Thus, if we consider the transition rate for MSUE graduates alone, a higher transition rate applies. In the absence of an exact educational profile of newly employed teachers, we estimate that 36 percent of MSUE graduates end up working as teachers. This corresponds to the national average for all higher education programs.

3.4.5. Overview on MSUE's Recruitment into Teaching

MSUE does not collect university-wide statistics, but rather, relies on statistical overviews at the departmental level. According to the administration of MSUE, none of the departments may be regarded as typical or representative of other departments. In the following figure (Figure 11), we therefore used average figures from three departments of MSUE to estimate recruitment into teaching. Figure 11 summarizes the five most important indicators discussed above.

²³ See Statistical Abstract (2011), Table 2.16.

Table 10: Completion Rates in Three Select Departments of MSUE

	Year 2006/07	Year 2007/08	Year 2008/09	Year 2009/10	Year 2010/11
Department: Primary Teacher Education					
Number of students who took the Teacher Education admission test	196	309	339	362	348
Number of students who were accepted	196	309	339	362	348
Number of students who enrolled in Primary Teacher Education	196	309	339	362	348
Number of students who finished MSUE Primary Teacher Education in 4 Years ("Survival Rate")	174	162	167	176	281
Average completion rate (in %)	N/A	N/A	N/A	89.7	90.0
Department: Secondary Teacher Education – School for Foreign Languages					
Number of students who took Teacher Education admission test	319	305	352	330	234
Number of Students who were accepted	273	254	311	202	218
Number of students who enrolled in Foreign Language Teacher Education	273	254	311	202	218
Number of students who finished Foreign Language Teacher Education in 4 Years ("Survival Rate")	119	100	126	193	201
Average completion rate (in %)	N/A	N/A	N/A	60.5	63.0
Department: Secondary Teacher Education – School for Mongolian Language and Literature					
Number of students who took Teacher Education admission test	337	330	375	372	380
Number of Students who were accepted	41	82	76	75	75
Number of students who enrolled in Mongolian Language Teacher Education	41	82	76	75	75
Number of students who finished Mongolian Language Teacher Education in 4 Years ("Survival Rate")	31	62	52	37	23
Average completion rate (in %)	N/A	N/A	N/A	90.2	56.1

Source: MSUE data.

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
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Figure 11: Estimates for Recruitment into Teaching, 2010/2011



Source: MSUE database.

As shown above, the majority of applicants who passed the admission test actually enrolled in MSUE, and 93 percent of those who applied were admitted. Of those who were admitted, all enrolled in teacher education studies. However, over the course of the four-year degree programs, approximately one-quarter (17 percent) either dropped out, had to terminate the studies due to financial hardship (could not pay the tuition or needed to work), switched to other degree programs, failed the final examination, or temporarily interrupted their studies.

Arguably, there is great variation among the different programs; primary teacher education has a high completion rate, that is, almost all students who start out in the program stay in the program and complete it within four years. In contrast, foreign languages degree programs have a low completion rate. In fact, the estimates suggest that at the end of the four-year program only 70 percent of the cohort, enrolled in foreign languages, completed their studies. An even greater cause for concern is the low transition rate; based on estimates in all fields of higher education, approximately 36 percent of the students became teachers. It should be noted that these estimates are conservative. The university-to-work transition rate is much lower for teacher education graduates from other universities, in particular for graduates from private or small universities. If we compare the enrollment rates in higher education with the completion rates for all teacher education institutions, the transition rate is as low as 23.4 percent. This means that on average, three-quarters of teacher education graduates in those universities are without a job or work outside the education sector upon graduation from educational studies.

3.5. RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING IN SINGAPORE, KYRGYZSTAN, AND MONGOLIA: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

The indicators for recruitment into teaching have been assessed for several countries including for league leaders and losers, respectively, of the TIMSS and PISA studies: Singapore and Kyrgyzstan. The Figures 12 and 13 on the next page show recruitment into teaching in Singapore and in Kyrgyzstan.

Singapore was ranked at the top in science and math in TIMSS 2003, and the Kyrgyz Republic scored at the bottom in PISA 2006 (ranked 57th out of 57 countries) and PISA 2009 (ranked 65th out of 65 countries). As Figure 12 illustrates, teacher education institutions are extremely selective in Singapore, and universities only accept 20 percent of those who apply. Almost all those who enroll complete their course of study and upon graduation, start working as teachers.

The situation is entirely different in the Kyrgyz Republic. Figure 13 illustrates the high attrition rate during teacher education programs, pointing to a huge waste of resources. In an attempt to combat teacher shortage, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic treats the teaching profession as a priority and allocates a disproportionately large number of scholarships to university students in pedagogical specializations; 36 percent of all teacher education students receive government scholarships as “budget” students. However, very few (17 percent) end up working as teachers. During the five-year teacher education diploma program, 37 percent of those enrolled either abandon their studies or switch to another program over the course of their studies. Only 63 percent of those who start teacher training actually obtain a higher education diploma with a teaching specialization. Of those that complete their studies with a teacher education specialization, even fewer choose to become teachers.

It goes without saying that the contexts vary considerably. Teaching is an attractive profession in Singapore, while for a variety of reasons (low and fragmented teacher salaries, difficult working environment, etc.), it is an utterly unattractive one in the Kyrgyz Republic. Teacher education institutions in Singapore can afford to be highly selective, whereas the same institutions in Kyrgyzstan only remain in operation because they use two negative selection criteria: first, they absorb students who were turned away in other degree programs due to low university entrance examination scores; and secondly, they attract those who depend on government scholarships.

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
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
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Figure 12: Effective Recruitment into Teaching (Singapore)



Source: McKinsey (2007).

Figure 13: Ineffective Recruitment into Teaching (Kyrgyzstan)



Source: Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova, Taliev (2008).²⁴

²⁴ Gita Steiner-Khamsi, Chinara Kumenova, and Nurlan Taliev, Nurlan. 2008. *Teacher Attraction and Retention Strategy. Background paper for the Education Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic 2011-2020.* Bishkek: Ministry of Education and Science, Department of Strategic and Analytic Work.

When we compare the findings from Mongolia with those for the league leader Singapore, two structural weaknesses become apparent:

- **Low stakes for admission.** The test scores and the review criteria for admission into teacher education have become more exclusive over the past three years, but they still are not sufficiently selective. In Mongolia, fewer but better and more highly motivated students should be admitted to teacher education studies. There is a risk that students enroll in teacher education as their second or third choice because they were not admitted into more selective degree programs.
- **Very low university-to-work transition rates.** It appears that teacher education studies represent for many students a generalist degree that equips them for all kinds of professions and not necessarily for the teaching profession. Only 23.4 percent to 36 percent of graduates ever become teachers. The low university-to-work transition rate is endemic to teacher education studies not only in Mongolia but also in OECD countries. Typically, the transition rate is higher for primary school teachers than for secondary teachers, if for no other reason than the fact that secondary school teachers have greater opportunities as subject specialists who can work in a wide array of professions. Nevertheless, the low transition rate represents a huge waste of human capital as well as government resources. An alignment of the pre-service teacher education curriculum with pedagogical rather than generalist skills and knowledge would help teacher education students identify more strongly with the teaching profession and would most likely improve the transition rates.

3.6. Summary and Recommendations

This chapter examined the effectiveness of pre-service teacher education in Mongolia based on the data that were made available by the Mongolian State University of Education (MSUE). The main findings are summarized in the following:

- (1) **Oversupply of teachers.** Every seventh bachelor's degree student in Mongolia, or 13.8 percent of all undergraduate students, is enrolled in teacher training and educational studies. In 2010/2011, 20,989 students were enrolled in the four-year degree program. In the same year, however, only 1,171 teachers were newly hired. Clearly, there is an oversupply of qualified teachers who are not absorbed by the labor market.
- (2) **The case study of MSUE.** Approximately 53 percent of teacher education students study at MSUE. This study therefore focused on an analysis of MSUE data and selected three departments that, according to the senior management of MSUE, are very different from each other: the Department of Primary Teacher Education, the Department of Foreign Languages, and the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature.
- (3) **Recruitment into teaching indicators.** This study was able to use four of the five indicators for effective teacher education that are commonly used in teacher education research: admission rate and criteria, enrollment rate, completion rate, and transition rate. There were no data available on the fifth indicator, the retention of newly qualified teachers in the profession two to five years after their employment as teachers.
- (4) **Admission and enrollment rates.** The required test scores have been raised over the past few years, making it more difficult to get accepted into teacher education. The average test

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scores for students admitted to the Department of Foreign Languages were much higher (710 points) than for those admitted to the Department of Primary Teacher Education (550 points) or the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature (584 points). There was a surge in applications and enrollments in academic years 2006/07 and 2007/08 when teacher salaries were significantly raised and the demand for teachers had grown due to an expansion of general education from 10 to 11, and later on, from 11 to 12 years.

- (5) **Completion rates.** The completion rate is low in the Department of Foreign Languages; approximately 30 percent of students in that department switch to other departments, interrupt their studies, fail the final exam, find employment before completing their studies, or do not finish their studies in the required period of four years for other reasons. The completion or survival rate is extremely high in the Department of Primary Teacher Education (approximately 90 percent).
- (6) **University-to-work transition rates.** Transition rates in higher education are low in all bachelor degree programs, as only one-third (36 percent) of graduates find employment in their professions. The transition rate in teacher education studies is much lower than for other bachelor programs in Mongolia; in the school year 2010/2011, only 1,171 teachers were newly hired.²⁵ This stands in stark contrast to the approximately 5,000 students who graduated in that year from pre-service teacher education programs across the nation. In other words, on average only 23.4 percent of teacher education graduates become teachers, which is a much lower transition rate than for any other bachelor's degree program. The remaining 3,829 graduates find other non-educational positions, re-apply for teaching positions in the following year, or remain unemployed. In our estimate for recruitment into teaching in Mongolia, we have used the higher estimate of 36 percent (the national average) for the transition rate at MSUE because the MSUE graduates are much more likely to find employment as teachers than graduates from other public and private universities.
- (7) Chapter 3 presented a comparison of recruitment into teaching in Mongolia with Singapore (which was ranked at the top in science and math in TIMSS 2003) and Kyrgyzstan (which scored at the bottom in PISA 2006 and PISA 2009). Pre-service teacher education in Mongolia is somewhat more effective but nevertheless comparable to the situation in Kyrgyzstan, where the completion rate is low (63 percent) and the transition rate is extremely low (17 percent). In particular, the low university-to-work transition rate in Mongolia (36 percent) is more similar to Kyrgyzstan (17 percent) than to Singapore, where almost every graduate in teacher education ends up working as a teacher.
- (8) There are two structural weaknesses in Mongolian pre-service teacher education: (1) the low stakes for admission and (2) the very low university-to-work transition rate. An alignment of the pre-service teacher education curriculum with pedagogical rather than generalist skills and knowledge would help teacher education students identify more strongly with the teaching profession and would most likely improve the transition rate.

²⁵ See Statistical Abstract (2011), Table 2.16.



©A teacher with students, Dadal Soum School, Khentii aimag

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 SALARY REFORM AT SCHOOL LEVEL

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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 SALARY REFORM AT THE SCHOOL LEVEL

As outlined in the introductory chapter, the 2007 salary reform was ambitious and fundamental. It revamped the structure and raised the value of the salary considerably. This chapter examines how the 2007 salary reform has been implemented at school-level. In particular, it focused on the following five aspects that the salary reform intended to accomplish:

- (1) Reduce the number of weekly teaching hours
- (2) Generate more predictable and transparent income
- (3) Reduce income inequalities between teachers in rural and urban schools
- (4) Eliminate teachers' need to generate additional income from a second job through the creation of full-time teaching positions
- (5) Make the teaching profession more attractive and reputable

All five objectives ultimately serve the improvement of quality in education. It is assumed that instructional quality improves significantly if teachers are able to teach fewer hours per week; only teach subjects for which they received training; entirely focus on their teaching rather than pursue multiple jobs; are motivated in their work; and are highly regarded by others. Based on this assumption, the chapter presents the implementation of the 2007 salary reform at school-level with special attention to the five aforementioned goals of the reform.

4.1. THE REDUCTION OF ACTUAL TEACHING HOURS

Under the previous salary structure, teachers were hired to teach for only 19 hours but were able to take on additional hours to improve their total monthly pay. This regulation mainly benefitted teachers in overcrowded *aimag*-center and city schools that, in the late 1990s, started to experience a huge influx of students due to internal migration from rural areas to province centers and the capital. This created not only salary differentials between urban and rural schools, but it also negatively affected the quality of education in all schools. In *aimag*-center schools and city schools, teachers engaged in excessive teaching, that is, 30 or more hours, or beyond 1.5 times the weekly teaching load of 19 hours. A teacher in urban and semi-urban schools had a much higher income than a teacher in rural schools because of these additional teaching hours. The salary differential resulted in rural flight, and only those teachers who either had family obligations or who were turned down from teaching jobs in cities and *aimag* centers remained in the *soum*-center schools.

Even though the 2007 salary reform does not provide a lower or upper ceiling for the weekly teaching hours, it does specify how the 40 hours of weekly workload should be used:

Joint Order #307/91/237:**On adopting the procedure to set the work norms of kindergarten and general education school teachers, and to calculate and discharge the salaries of teachers and certain other officials***Section Two.*

10. The weekly hours of a school and kindergarten teacher shall be 40 hours.

11. A school teacher shall complete works equal to 34 hours of implementing the standards and other work equal to 6 hours in a week. 19 of the 34 hours corresponding to the works to implement standards shall be designated for teaching hours.³

Joint Order #307/91/237, quoted above, further elaborates on the definition of overtime: payment for overtime is considered, as was before, if a teacher teaches beyond the 19 hours of statutory teaching load. In this case, the teacher is compensated in accordance with Article 53 of the Labor Law.

The interview question on the minimum and maximum number of teaching hours yielded unreliable answers because both managers and teachers avoided speaking about excessive teaching loads. The research team therefore used the teacher weekly work schedule to retrieve information on how many hours the teachers at the school were teaching on average. In addition, the research team gathered data on the lowest and highest teaching load assigned to teachers in the school. The data were collected for all four terms in the school year in recognition that the weekly teaching hours may vary by term.

Average teaching hours: On the average, teachers teach 20.4 hours per week—that is, teachers make approximately 1.4 hours of overtime per week for additional teaching and earn therefore slightly more than two hours more in addition to their base salary.²⁶The supplementary income from these additional hours amounts to 3,860 MNT per week or 15,442 MNT per month.²⁷

Lowest and highest teaching hours per week: On average, the lowest teaching assignment in the examined schools was 15.7 hours and the highest was 25.6 hours per week. As shown in Table 11, there were a few outliers, that is, teachers who taught far more than 25.6 hours (up to 39 hours) and others who taught significantly less than 25.6 hours (9 hours per week is the minimum).

²⁶ Each hour of additional teaching is multiplied with 1.5. The exact formula of Article 53 of the Labor Law is listed in Joint Order #307/91/237 (August 2007: Section 3, Point 24): Basic salary/168 hours x 1.5 x hours exceeding 19 hours).

²⁷ We used the average of 1.4 additional hours. For two full additional hours, the additional income would be—depending on the base salary—in the range of 21,316 MNT to 25,011 MNT per month.

Table 11: Lowest and Highest Teaching Hours per Week by School (N=25)

School	Lowest	Highest
O-7	15	25
A-4	19	25
O-4	15	26
A-U	17	22
U-3	19	36
U-B	18	39
U-KH	19	26
UB-42	19	24
O-18	11	25
A-I	17	22
U-1	18	24
KH-B	9	27
KH-M	17	25
U-KH	14	23
A-KH	19	22
O-B	18	25
O-18	19	25
O-N	19	24
A-IK	19	22
A-1	19	21
KH-J	19	29
KH-M	19	25
UB-44	19	30
KH-T	19	29
O-2	19	19

There are two outliers that employ one or more teachers with very high weekly teaching loads (36 hours per week and 39 hours per week), and both schools are located in Omnogobi province. They report shortage in English and Math, but apart from these outliers, excessive teaching is a practice from the past.

Even though Joint Order #307/91/237 does not provide a lower or upper limit for teaching hours, schools do not assign additional teaching hours in excess unless there is a shortage in a particular subject. Reportedly, in its annual visit, the State Inspection Agency reviews whether only licensed teachers are employed. It also recommends that the school hires additional teachers if some of the teachers take on too many teaching hours.

From the 123 teachers recorded in the database, only 37 teachers did not teach additional hours. This means that 70 percent of teachers taught at least one additional hour. From a budgetary perspective, it would therefore make more sense to increase the weekly teaching hours from 19 hours to 20 hours, and with it proportionally raise the base salary, to reflect actual practice. This would make more sense rather than paying 70 percent of teachers' overtime rates.

From an international comparative perspective, the statutory teaching load in Mongolia is very low. Teachers are required to teach 19 hours per week for 34 weeks per year.²⁸ The annual statutory teaching

²⁸ The school year lasts 34 weeks.

load of 646 hours is extremely low. The average for OECD countries is 779 hours per year in primary school, 701 hours in lower secondary school, and 656 in upper secondary school.²⁹ It is important to note that there is no direct relation between educational quality and statutory teaching load of teachers. For example, Finland (league leader in PISA 2002) prescribes an annual statutory teaching load of 677 hours for primary teachers, 592 for lower secondary teachers, and 550 for upper secondary teachers. In contrast, the statutory teaching load of teachers in the United States is on the other end of the extreme, as they are required to teach 28-30 hours per week, or annually slightly over 1,000 hours.

In practice, seventy percent of teachers in Mongolia average 697 paid hours per year rather than the statutory teaching load of 646 hours. Thus, the proposition to increase the statutory teaching hours for teachers in Mongolia is related to the school curriculum (mainly in primary school), and would be a matter of adjusting the regulation to reflect the current practice in schools.

4.2. A MORE PREDICTABLE AND TRANSPARENT INCOME

There were three features of the previous salary structure (pre-2007 salary reform) that made the teacher salary unpredictable and non-transparent:

- Fragmentation
- Deductions from salary supplements
- Bonus system

These elements will be addressed in the following sections.

4.2.1. Fragmentation

Back in 2005, teachers and education managers who were interviewed in the PETS Mongolia study were not able to specify how much money they were making for the past or current month because the salary was fragmented and the extent of supplement deductions was unpredictable. At present, the salary structure is slightly less fragmented than in 2005. There are several components that make up the salary of a teacher in Mongolia in 2012. The following list and Figure 14 illustrate the various components of today's salary structure:


- Base salary (5 salary categories, determined by years of experience)
- Additional teaching hours
- Supplements for functions:
 - class teacher
 - cabinet
 - head of section
- Supplement for rank (lead teacher, methodologist, advisor)
- Bonuses for performance:
 - Quarterly allowance (A, B, C)
 - Outcomes-based addition/bonus
 - Olympiads, competition
- Benefits for public servants/teachers (from central budget and local budget)

²⁹ See OECD. (2001). *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators*. Paris: OECD (see indicator D4, p. 422 ff.).

We would argue that the structure of the teacher salary has not changed post-reform, despite a major increase in the nominal value of the various components that make up the total pay. In other words, today's salary structure is as fragmented as it was before 2007 with the following exception: the number of salary supplements for function has been reduced to three functions only—that is, class teacher, cabinet, head of section. All other components already existed prior to the reform. As will be shown later in this report, performance bonuses have a much greater weight as a percentage of the total pay than before.

The elimination of functional supplements—in particular notebook checking—seen as an integral part of the teaching profession in other educational systems has elicited protests among some group of teachers. The qualitative data from this study reveal that primary teachers especially complain about the lack of this additional supplement. A few education managers who had been working for many years in the system observed that teachers tended to grade less and provide less feedback to students than before. In general, there were many complaints about the elimination of the notebook-checking supplement by both education managers and primary teachers. However, these complaints need to be put into perspective: the elimination of the notebook grading supplement should be viewed from an educational rather than a financial perspective as a fundamental change that alters the role of the teacher as well as that of the education manager. Seen positively, the elimination of this particular functional supplement

Figure 14: Composition of the Teacher Salary, 2011



signals to teachers that the formative evaluation of students is part and parcel of the teaching profession and, for this reason, does not need to be compensated additionally. For education managers, the elimination of the notebook-checking supplement entails less control and less micro-management of teachers. Their previous role involved meticulously counting the number of notebooks checked by teachers and measuring it in terms of the frequency of red ink used on student notebooks. If necessary, the managers would determine deductions from the supplement and think of additional punitive measures. Clearly, any reform that targets the change in professional identity needs to be considered fundamental, even if it is minor in financial terms, as was the case in the functional supplement for notebook checking. Understandably, the professionals—teachers and managers—at first resisted such a fundamental change.

It is important to point out that the functional supplement for class teachers has been preserved. Primary school teachers earn slightly more than secondary school teachers because they are class teachers by default. However, their chances of making additional income from extra teaching hours are also smaller. The other two functional supplements are less controversial. The supplement for head of section is a proxy for the rank of the teacher who is heading the section. Teachers who tend to serve as heads of the section are typically teachers with professional qualifications—that is, lead teachers, methodologists, or advisors who already earn a rank supplement. Thus, despite the fundamental reform of 2007, experienced teachers tend to be rewarded three times more than young and inexperienced teachers. Older teachers earn more because:

- their base salary is higher because their salary category, based exclusively on years of teaching, is higher (total: 5 categories)
- they are more likely to receive a rank supplement for having been promoted to lead teacher, methodologist, and in a few cases to advisors; and
- the chances of being entrusted with supervising a cabinet (resource center, class room, laboratory, etc.) or heading a section are higher than for younger teachers.

In fact, a fourth phenomenon needs to be mentioned in this context. Even though there are far fewer additional hours assigned to teachers than before the 2007 salary reform, the ones that have the best chances of getting assigned additional hours are older or experienced teachers. In the interviews with education managers, the managers pointed out two selection criteria for assigning teachers to additional hours: (a) subject match and (b) teaching experience. In the current salary system in which the nominal value of the base salary and the supplements were substantially raised, there seems to be little justification for having these kinds of retention payments, which are more typical of systems that fear losing effective and experienced teachers to other professions or the private sector.

4.2.2. Deduction of Salary Supplements

One of the most intriguing findings of the PETS Mongolia Study that we managed to problematize was the deduction of salary supplements. There used to be a very elaborate, time-consuming and, for teachers, humiliating control apparatus in place to review teachers' work. The various salary supplements, each one of them only amounting to a small fraction of the total pay, served as an entry point for managers to sanction teachers. The PET study solicited information on deductions administered by principals,

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education managers, and (in larger schools) by social workers to 436 teachers and 233 education managers in the PETS sample. Deductions from salary supplements, and to a lesser extent also from the base salary, were common practice in 2005. The largest deduction made in the schools of the PETS sample was on average 6,975 MNT per month, which was at that time 6.7 percent of the mean monthly teachers' income (average total pay of teachers was 103,647 MNT in 2005). The technical report of the PETS Mongolia study discusses the deductions in greater detail.³⁰

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The phenomenon of teacher absenteeism or prolonged absences is virtually nonexistent in Mongolia because the salary is deducted from for the days missed in school. The PETS Mongolia study (World Bank 2007, see Table 6) found that the proportion of teachers in rural schools who were absent on the survey day was much higher than those in urban schools; it was in fact three times higher. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the school administrators may have misunderstood the term and equated teacher absenteeism with teacher vacancies—a fact that is also highlighted in the PETS Mongolia report. In any case, teacher absenteeism is not a common phenomenon, even though there used to exist vast differences with regard to regular attendance between teachers in rural and in urban schools.

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The reasons for deductions from the salary supplements or the base salary were quite diverse and difficult to assess objectively. They included pedagogical issues (lesson planning and attention to student development); disciplinary issues with students (class management); personal characteristics of the teacher (personal organization and responsibility or morality, self-discipline and communication); and concerns that are particularly important to the school administration (organization of official documents and maintenance of school property). The most frequent reason for supplement reduction was when class teachers did not ensure that their students were on good behavior. Twenty-six percent of all “infractions”—leading to a supplement deduction—were related to “poor class management.” The PETS Mongolia showed clearly that both the additions (supplements, bonuses) and the deductions from the supplements lacked measurable and unambiguous evaluation criteria. Therefore, most school administrators used to resort to purely subjective evaluation criteria, which were at times more interpersonal than professional.

Has the situation changed six years later? From a legal perspective, the situation has indeed changed. The regulation on supplements was revised and now states the entitlement in terms of percentages of the base salary. The supplement for class teacher amounts to ten percent of the base salary, for cabinet leader five percent, and for head of the section five percent. The earlier, vague formulation of “*up to ten percent*” or “*up to five percent*” was replaced, thereby making deductions impossible from a legal perspective. It is perhaps for this reason that none of the interviewed teachers in this study reported deductions from salary supplements. The social worker is in charge of monitoring the work of teachers as class teachers, and the education managers reviews the supplementary work of cabinet organization and head of the section. As before, each school lists the tasks for class teacher, cabinet leader, and head of section, but in contrast to a few years ago, the salary supplements are no longer deducted (in part or completely) if teachers are not performing well on these additional tasks. Today there is another mechanism in place to express discontent with the teacher's work: the bonus system. Teachers who, according to the evaluation carried out by education managers perform poorly either in their teaching or in their supplementary task(s), are supposed to receive a smaller bonus or no bonus at all. Both an outcomes-based contract and a quarterly performance bonus are supposed to control and sanction teachers.³¹

³⁰ Gita Steiner-Khamsi and A. Gerelmaa (2006). The Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in Mongolia. Technical Report. New York and Ulaanbaatar: Teachers College, Columbia University & Open Society Forum, February 2006 (see chapter 5 on deductions).

³¹ For quarterly performance bonus, see Resolution of the Government of Mongolia #54, December 10, 2008.

4.2.3. The Multiplicity of the Bonus System

How are bonuses used at the school level? Are they, in practice, used to monitor the performance of teachers and provide incentives for high-performing or effective teachers? It is perhaps one of the most unexpected findings of the UNICEF Mongolia Study on Teachers that the bonus for quarterly performance is given indiscriminately to almost all teachers of a school; only in very rare instances, is the bonus for quarterly performance withheld.

The issue here is the unpredictability of the monthly salary due to the multiplicity of the bonus system. The salary supplement that arises from the outcomes-based contract, in particular, is unpredictable because the funds have to be generated at the school level (and in most cases from savings) and disbursed at the end of the fiscal and/or academic year. Chapter 5 discusses in greater detail the issues related to the bonus system.

4.3. THE REDUCTION OF INCOME INEQUALITIES BETWEEN TEACHERS IN RURAL AND URBAN SCHOOLS

There are four sources of potential income inequalities that deserve closer examination. Teachers in urban schools earn more than those in rural schools because of one or more of the following:

- (1) **Higher base salary:** Are teachers in urban schools on the average older, that is, have more teaching experience and therefore fall into a higher base salary category?
- (2) **Higher rank:** Do teachers in urban schools on average hold a higher rank than teachers in semi-urban and rural schools, and therefore earn a salary supplement as lead teacher, methodologist, and/or advisor?
- (3) **More additional hours:** Do teachers in urban schools teach more hours than in rural or semi-urban schools and therefore have a higher total pay per month?
- (4) **Higher income from outcomes-based contract:** Are urban schools able to save more money at the end of the fiscal and/or academic year, and are therefore in a position to increase incentives to their teachers for their performance in outcomes-based contracts?

There are national data available for questions 1 and 2. However, the EMIS data on the years of experience and qualifications of teachers (EMIS 2010/11, Table 2.16) only distinguishes by regions, *aimags*, and Ulaanbaatar. As a result, it is not possible to differentiate between teachers working in urban, semi-urban and rural schools. It is, therefore, necessary to empirically analyze these questions using primary data collected in the UNICEF Mongolia study.

4.3.1. Age of Teachers by Location

According to EMIS 2010/11 data,³² 33.7 percent of teachers in Mongolia are 30 years old or younger. Table 12 presents the age distribution of teachers in the sample of this study (N=123) by the location of the school in which they are employed. In contrast to a few years ago, teachers in city or *aimag*-center schools are no longer older and more experienced than teachers in *soum*-center schools. This also means

³² See Statistical Abstract 2010/11, Table 2.16.

that their base salary is, on average, no longer higher than the base salary of teachers in *soum*-center schools. In fact, as shown in Table 12, there are more young teachers (under the age of 25 years old) in city schools, and more middle-aged and older teachers (over 36 years old) in *soum*-center schools. It is important to keep socio-demographic changes in mind; city and *aimag*-center schools have had more job openings for the past ten years than *soum*-center schools due to the rural-urban migration of the population and the rapid growth of the city population. Unlike the past, however, experienced teachers in rural schools do not seem to leave their post to assume a position in a city school.

Table 12: Age of Teachers by Location of School (N=123)

		Age of teacher					Total
		Under 25	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 and above	
City	Count	6	17	9	9	0	41
	% within location of school	14.6%	41.5%	22.0%	22.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.9%	13.8%	7.3%	7.3%	.0%	33.3%
Aimag center	Count	5	14	11	9	2	41
	% within location of school	12.2%	34.1%	26.8%	22.0%	4.9%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.1%	11.4%	8.9%	7.3%	1.6%	33.3%
Soum	Count	3	19	11	8	0	41
	% within location of school	7.3%	46.3%	26.8%	19.5%	.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	2.4%	15.4%	8.9%	6.5%	.0%	33.3%
Total	Count	14	50	31	26	2	123
	% within location of school	11.4%	40.7%	25.2%	21.1%	1.6%	100.0%
	% of Total	11.4%	40.7%	25.2%	21.1%	1.6%	100.0%

4.3.2. Rank of Teachers by Location

There is supposed to be a close association between age or teaching experience and rank; schools with more experienced teachers should have more teachers who hold the rank of methodologist teacher (lowest rank), lead teacher, or advisor teacher (highest rank). This is not the case in Mongolia. As Table 13 illustrates, however, city and *aimag*-center schools have younger teachers *and* more teachers who hold a rank as compared with teachers employed at a *soum*-center school. In *soum*-center schools, 58.5 percent of teachers have not been promoted, that is, they hold no rank. The proportion of regular teachers (without a rank) as a percentage of the total number of teachers is much lower in city schools (42.5 percent) and *aimag*-center schools (41.5 percent) than in *soum*-center schools (58.5 percent). This particular finding sheds serious doubts on the fairness of the promotion criteria which, for example, distinguish at which level the teacher has moderated workshops and conducted research: *soum*, *aimag*, or city level (see Table 7). Based on the greater number of experienced teachers in *soum*-center schools, one would expect a larger proportion of teachers with a rank in *soum*-center schools. Clearly, there is a need to revisit the promotion criteria and ensure that they do not discriminate against high-achieving

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and effective teachers based in *soum*-center schools.

Table 13: Rank of Teachers by Location of School (N=123)

		What rank do you have?				Total
		None	Methodologist	Lead	Advisor	
City	Count	17	12	11	0	40
	% within location of school	42.5%	30.0%	27.5%	.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	13.9%	9.8%	9.0%	.0%	32.8%
Aimag center	Count	17	13	10	1	41
	% within location of school	41.5%	31.7%	24.4%	2.4%	100.0%
	% of Total	13.9%	10.7%	8.2%	.8%	33.6%
Soum	Count	24	8	9	0	41
	% within location of school	58.5%	19.5%	22.0%	.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	19.7%	6.6%	7.4%	.0%	33.6%
Total	Count	58	33	30	1	122
	% within location of school	47.5%	27.0%	24.6%	.8%	100.0%
	% of Total	47.5%	27.0%	24.6%	.8%	100.0%

Table 14: Additional Teaching Hours by Location (N=123)

		How many hours did you teach in term 2?						Total
		18 and below	19	20-22	23-25	26 and above	no answer	
City	Count	0	10	22	5	2	2	41
	% within location of school	.0%	24.4%	53.7%	12.2%	4.9%	4.9%	100.0%
	% of Total	.0%	8.1%	17.9%	4.1%	1.6%	1.6%	33.3%
Aimag center	Count	0	21	11	6	2	1	41
	% within location of school	.0%	51.2%	26.8%	14.6%	4.9%	2.4%	100.0%
	% of Total	.0%	17.1%	8.9%	4.9%	1.6%	.8%	33.3%
Soum	Count	2	22	12	4	1	0	41
	% within location of school	4.9%	53.7%	29.3%	9.8%	2.4%	.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.6%	17.9%	9.8%	3.3%	.8%	.0%	33.3%
Total	Count	2	53	45	15	5	3	123
	% within location of school	1.6%	43.1%	36.6%	12.2%	4.1%	2.4%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.6%	43.1%	36.6%	12.2%	4.1%	2.4%	100.0%

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4.3.3. Additional Teaching Hours by Location

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This study solicited information on additional teaching hours for each of the four terms of the school year. It appears that the greatest number of additional teaching hours occurs during the second term. Table 14 presents the breakdown of additional teaching hours by location for the second term of school year 2010/11. One interesting finding was that more than half of the teachers employed at city schools (53.7 percent) teach 20-22 hours per week. This is a significantly different work pattern than in *soum*-center and *aimag* schools, where most of the teachers work only 19 hours. In other words, teachers in city schools continue to have a greater chance of earning additional income by taking on additional teaching hours. As opposed to 2005, when PETS Mongolia data were collected, teachers in city schools currently teach an average of only one or two additional hours more than their counterparts in *aimag* or *soum*-center schools. With the exception of two outlier schools in Omnogobi *aimag* where teachers work excessive hours because of teacher shortage, schools only very rarely assign to teachers more than four additional teaching hours per week. Thus, even the number of additional teaching hours significantly varies by location of the school, but the discrepancy is no longer as large in terms of weekly hours and monetary value to make such a difference in terms of teaching quality and teacher salary.

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4.3.4. Additional Income from Bonuses by Location

As will be explained in further detail in Chapter 5, the outcomes-contract bonus is the only bonus that is paid from the school's education fund. Naturally, large schools are able to save more money in educational systems that use per-capita financing than small schools. The question therefore is the following: is it more likely for one to receive an outcomes-based bonus if one teaches at a city or *aimag*-center school, rather than if one is employed as a teacher in a *soum*-center school? Table 15 compares bonus payments for outcomes-contracts in the three different types of schools.

Given the scarcity of funds in *soum*-center schools, it is surprising that *soum*-center schools are the ones that hand out bonuses for the outcomes-contracts more generously than schools in *aimag*-centers or cities. Almost half of the interviewed teachers in *soum*-schools (19 out of 41) received an outcomes-based bonus in the past school year.

Table 15: Bonus Payments for Outcomes-Contracts by Location (N=123)

		How much was the percentage of the last bonus?											Total
		8	10	15	25	30	32	35	40	45	50	80	
City	Count	0	4	2	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	13
	% within location of school	.0%	30.8%	15.4%	7.7%	.0%	7.7%	.0%	7.7%	15.4%	7.7%	7.7%	100.0%
Aimag center	Count	1	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
	% within location of school	12.5%	62.5%	.0%	12.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	12.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Soum	Count	0	6	5	0	5	0	2	0	1	0	0	19
	% within location of school	.0%	31.6%	26.3%	.0%	26.3%	.0%	10.5%	.0%	5.3%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	1	15	7	2	5	1	2	2	3	1	1	40
	% of Total	2.5%	37.5%	17.5%	5.0%	12.5%	2.5%	5.0%	5.0%	7.5%	2.5%	2.5%	100.0%

The amount of the outcomes contract ranges typically between 10-30 percent of the annual base salary, that is, amounts to one or two additional monthly salary per year. This finding confirms other studies on teachers in Mongolia³³ that highlight the preference of *soum*-center schools to channel the funds from income-generating activities as well as from savings to provisions that benefit teachers. Interestingly, *soum*-center schools seem to use their financial funds to reward their teachers even though their savings are smaller than those in large schools.

4.4. FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AS A TEACHER

One of the problems raised in earlier studies, dating back to the studies from DANIDA and then reiterated in the PETS Mongolia study,³⁴ arose from the multiple sources of income that teachers in Mongolia had to rely on in order to make a living. The situation has changed from the previous standpoint in two distinct ways: (a) teachers are now in one of the highest income categories for public servants; and (b) the work of a teacher is full-time (40 hours) and thus, according to the Labor Law, the teacher is not permitted to take on additional jobs.

First, the teacher salary was raised considerably. As outlined in Chapter 1, only five and a half percent (5.5 percent) of the population earns 400,000 MNT or more per month. The average minimum monthly base salary for teachers in Mongolia is 324,292 MNT; this is the salary without any supplements or overtime for teaching. The estimated average total pay (with supplements, additional hours) totals 374,181 MNT (see Chapter 5). In city schools and other schools that have additional sources of income or are able to have savings, the total pay may be higher. This is not to suggest that teachers are pleased

³³ Notably, the evaluation of DANIDA RSDP II (Rural School Development Project).

³⁴ For more than a decade DANIDA was committed to pre- serving and improving schools in remote rural areas. Beginning in 1992, DANIDA supported rural school development. Their recurring grants, however, were not primarily directed toward the rehabilitation of boarding schools, but rather focused on improving the overall learning environment and the quality of education in rural schools. For the early DANIDA study on teachers' work and living condition, see E. Nørgaard (2002). *School development in Mongolia 1992-2000*. Copenhagen: International Centre for Educational Development.

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with their salary. In fact, one is surprised how much teachers complain about their salary. There is a culture of complaint among teachers in Mongolia that deserves explanation. A few possible reasons for this dissatisfaction come to mind, especially as teachers tend to compare their salaries with what others make and with what they have to pay in terms of living expenses. Some comparisons made are:

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- **Comparison with the private sector:** Salaries in the private sector are much higher and teachers observe that their peers who left the public sector have a much higher income.

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- **Comparison with administrators:** There exist unofficial sources of income at the school level, especially for principals and accountants, and teachers find it unfair that they have to rely only on official sources.

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- **Comparison with actual living expenses:** Teachers are heavily indebted and are in a perpetual crisis with regard to salary loans. Every month significant deductions are made from their income to repay their loans, leaving them with very small earnings.

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It is important to understand the mindset of teachers and their frame of reference in order to understand why they express their dissatisfaction. However, even though the subjective assessment of teachers needs to be taken into account, there is no ground for complaint about salaries when one considers that the teaching job in Mongolia is, in effect, a part-time job. Only in a handful of schools that we visited were teachers expected to stay on the school premises, grade papers, prepare lessons, or meet with students, teachers, school administrators or parents. The typical scenario is that teachers leave school upon completion of the daily instruction. As a result, they work on average 20.5 hours/week at the school and a few more hours at home for lesson preparation and grading. In addition, the school year consists of 34 weeks, and is therefore relatively short. There were two reasons given for why teachers do not normally work 40 hours per week:

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- **Space:** Almost all schools in Mongolia teach in two shifts and very few schools have a Teachers' Room that is large enough to be used as a workplace for teachers. Unlike schools in other countries, there is no space for teachers to work except for when they teach. In other countries, teachers have an office at the school (e.g., in Japan) or have their own classroom (e.g., in United States) that they can use for work.
- **Control:** Many education managers pointed out that there are limits to how much they can exert their authority to make teachers work at the school or stay engaged beyond the actual teaching load.
- Unlike teachers who are permitted to teach additional hours and leave the school premises upon completion of the teaching load, education managers have to stay and work for 40 hours. In addition, they are not entitled to the kind of seniority bonuses that teachers receive after five, ten, and fifteen years of teaching. They also do not enjoy the privileges or the autonomy that principals have to secure additional income from bribes and other non-official sources. They, therefore, find their middle position ("sandwich") unpleasant between being *de facto* an overworked teacher and an underpaid administrator. The majority of the education managers was dissatisfied with their position and would have preferred to work as regular teachers.

4.5. ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION

There are two measures for the attractiveness of the teaching profession: (a) average test scores of admitted students and (b) number of enrollments in teacher education studies. As discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 3), both the test scores and the number of enrollments have risen substantially since 2006.

The average admission test scores for teacher education studies used to be 520-540 points in 2006/07. Four years later, in 2010/11, the Department of Primary Teacher Education raised the required score to 550 points. In other departments, the increase was more substantial; the average test score for applicants to the Department of Mongolian Language and Literature at MSUE was 584 points and for the Department of Foreign Languages 710 (see Figure 9).

In the same vein, enrollment figures for teacher education have grown considerably, leading us to suggest that teacher education studies have in fact become more popular, reputable, and attractive as a result of the teacher salary reform.

4.6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter examined whether the 2007 salary reform did, in actual practice at school-level, accomplish what it meant to improve. It focused on the following five key objectives that were the drivers for the 2007 reform:

- (1) Reduction of weekly teaching hours
- (2) A more predictable and transparent income
- (3) Reduction of income inequalities between teachers in rural and urban schools
- (4) Elimination of teachers' need to generate additional income from a second job through the creation of full-time teaching positions
- (5) Making the teaching profession more attractive and reputable

Rather than reiterating the points made earlier in this chapter, the following Table 16 summarizes the key findings. These findings clearly show that the 2007 salary reform has had a major positive impact on the work conditions of teachers (teachers teach fewer hours and only have one job rather than several jobs), teacher's income, and the overall reputation of the teaching profession.

Table 16: Summary Table of Key Findings and Recommendations

	Objective	Key Findings (F)	Recommendations (R)
1	Reduction of weekly teaching hours	F.1.1. The statutory teaching load is 19 hours per week, but teachers work on average 20.4 hours, that is, they receive 1.4 hours of overtime. 70 percent of teachers teach at least 1 additional hour per week.	R.1. Increase the statutory teaching load from 19 to 20 hours per week and raise the base salary accordingly. This will reduce overtime payments and also increases the annual statutory teaching load to 697 hours (34 weeks per year).
2		F.1.2. The lowest teaching load was 15.7 hours and the highest 25.6 hours. Teaching excessive hours is a practice of the past.	R.1.2. No recommendations – the objective to prevent excessive teaching has been accomplished.
3		F.1.3. The statutory teaching load is 646 hours per year in Mongolia regardless of school level. It is much lower than the OECD average of 779 hours (primary), 701 hours (lower secondary), and 656 hours (upper secondary).	R.1.3. The annual statutory teaching load should be increased to 697 hours per year in the short run (1 hour per week more; see first point above). In the medium-term, the instructional time for students as well as the teaching load for teachers should be increased and the teaching load of teachers should be distinguished by school level.
4	More Predictable and Transparent Income	F.2.1. The salary structure has remained the same and is composed of the following six elements: base salary, additional hours, supplements for function, supplements for rank, bonuses for performance, and general benefits for public servants.	R.2.1. Many educational systems compensate internally, that is, teachers who teach fewer hours have to normally take on additional functions, and vice versa (see point R.2.2.). In the long run, the fragmentation of the salary could be reduced to four elements with additional hours & supplementary functions being the exception rather than the norm for most teachers.
5		F.2.2. There are fewer functional supplements now than in the past. They are reduced to three: class teacher, cabinet organizer, and head of section.	R.2.2. In the medium-term, teachers who function as class teachers, cabinet organizers, or heads of section should be released from teaching by 1 or 2 hours per week rather than receiving supplementary payment.
6		F.2.3. The bonus system is fragmented and unequal between schools.	R.2.3. There is a need to completely revamp the bonus system – the next chapter explicitly deals with the bonus system.
	Reduce income inequalities between rural and urban schools	F.3.1. Teachers in urban and semi-urban do not teach more additional hours as compared to teachers in rural schools. The contrary applies in the sample of the schools that were examined: the schools with the largest actual teaching loads are <i>soum</i> -center schools based in Omnogobi (cause: teacher shortage.)	R.3.2. Income equality, arising from additional teaching hours, has been diminished.
		F.3.2. Teachers in semi-urban and urban schools are likely to hold a higher rank (have more lead teachers and advisors), because the criteria for promotion fits better teachers in those schools. For promotion to the rank of lead teachers, teachers need to have conducted research and workshops at <i>aimag</i> -centers or city level.	R.3.2. There is a need to revise the criteria for promotion from methodologist to lead teacher in order to ensure that teachers from rural schools are not at a disadvantage.

CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 SALARY REFORM AT SCHOOL LEVEL

4	Full-time employment as a teacher	F.4.1. Teachers do not (officially) hold several jobs in order to make a living. Currently, teachers are among the highest paid public servants.	R.4.1. No recommendations – the objective of raising the teacher salary to a level that enables teachers to focus only on their job has been accomplished.
		F.4.2. Teachers do not remain on the school premises upon completion of their teaching load, mostly because of a shortage of space for the teacher, but also lack of accountability. Today, all teachers in Mongolia in effect work part-time. Despite the move from the teaching load (19 hours/week) to the weekly workload system (40 hours/week), they only stay at school for 19 hours or 20.4 hours/week respectively.	R.4.2. In the medium-term the teachers’ rooms should be upgraded and rooms for private meetings with parents should also be established. In the long run, the two-shift system should be replaced with a one-shift system that has teachers work for longer hours at the school and students stay at school longer.
		F.4.3. There is inequality between teachers and education managers. The education managers are expected to stay at school for 40 hours per week. They do not have the same privileges as teachers (seniority awards, going home after the end of teaching, etc.) and are devoid of possibilities of making additional income as other school administrators have.	R.4.3. There is a need to review the functions and payment of education managers.
5	Attractiveness of the Teaching Profession	F.5.1. Admission to teacher education studies has become more rigorous. It now attracts students who did academically well in upper secondary school and at the entry exam. The average test scores at MSUE for admitted to the B.A program raised from 520-540 points to 550-710 points, depending on the field of study within teacher education.	R.5.1. No recommendation – the admission requirements have improved and the standards for admission were raised (at MSUE).
		F.5.2. Enrollment in teacher education studies almost doubled in the period 2004-2011. The biggest hike was for the academic year 2006/07 and 2007/08.	R.5.2. No recommendations – the teaching profession has become more attractive and teacher education studies attract a great number of students. It is important, however, to implement quality assurance mechanisms more rigorously in the smaller, private teacher education B.A. programs.

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CHAPTER 5

TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS AND THE BONUS SYSTEM

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CHAPTER 5: TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS AND THE BONUS SYSTEM

The previous chapter explained the structure of the teacher salary and focused on those elements of the salary that relate to the additional teaching hours, supplements for functions, and supplements for rank. In this chapter, data on the three different bonuses are presented and factored into the total pay of teachers.

5.1. THE TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS: TEACHERS WITH AN AVERAGE, HIGH, AND LOW INCOME

As outlined in the previous chapter (see Figure 14), the total pay of teachers is composed of six elements. This study analyzed all of the teacher-related components—base salary, additional teaching hour, supplements for functions, supplement for rank, bonuses—but did not examine the sixth element that deals with the general benefits which are available to all public servants. The general benefits granted to public servants are given by both the central as well as local governments and so, vary widely. Similarly, the rural bonus for teachers working in *soum*-center or *bagh* schools (10 percent of the base salary) or *aimag*-center schools (8 percent of the base salary) is not included in the calculation for the total pay of teachers.³⁵

Figures 15, 16, and 17 present the compositions of three prototypical teacher salaries. The three figures show the total pay of teachers with an average income, high income, and low income. Different from the base salary, the total monthly pay also includes payments for additional teaching hours, supplements and bonuses. We have identified three teachers from this study database who represent these three prototypes.

Average total pay (Figure 15): 374,181 MNT. The first teacher (teacher code 1) is a teacher whose total pay represents an average. The teacher with an average income typically:

- earns a base salary for teachers with 13-18 years of experience (309,091 MNT)
- teaches one additional hour (11,000 MNT)
- receives a functional supplement that is equivalent to 10 percent of the base salary (30,909 MNT)
- is a regular teacher and therefore does not receive any rank supplement (0 MNT)
- receives a quarterly bonus that is on the average 30 percent of the base salary (23,181 MNT)

³⁵ The rural bonus payment is regulated in the Government Resolution #90 of 2001. It is 8-10 percent for teachers working in *aimag*-center or *soum*-center/*bagh* schools, respectively, and 15 percent for school directors, education managers, social workers, and pre-school managers working in rural and semi-urban schools. It is questionable thought whether education managers receive in practice the supplement. Several education managers in the study complained that they did not receive the rural supplement.

Figure 15: Average Total Pay per Month



Figure 16: Average Income of Teachers in the High-Income Category





Figure 17: Average Income of Teachers in the Low-Income Category



High-income total pay (Figure 16): 546,737 MNT. The second teacher (teacher code 40) represents the group of teachers who are in the high-income category.³⁶ Her base salary reflects that of a teacher who has worked for 19-24 years, teaches six additional hours, is given a rank supplement of 15 percent, receives all three functional supplements, and has received a quarterly bonus of 40 percent.

Low-income total pay (Figure 17): 317,079 MNT. The third teacher (teacher code 62) is in the lowest base salary category, because she has only one to five years of teaching experience and does not earn any supplements with the exception of a 25 percent quarterly performance bonus.

The empirical data on teacher salaries, retrieved from the interviews with the teachers (N=123) at school-level, show that the average monthly teacher salary with supplements is 374,181 MNT. The salary for low-income teachers (typically young teachers with few additional hours and no supplements) is on average 317,079 MNT per month. At the other end of the spectrum are teachers in the high-income category. They are typically experienced and hold the title of methodologist teacher or advisor teacher. Precisely because they are experienced, they are allocated more teaching hours, are given additional supplements, and receive more awards than the inexperienced or regular teacher. The high-end salary for this group of teachers averages 546,737 MNT per month.

It cannot be sufficiently reiterated that these figures on the total monthly pay of teachers represent entitled salary amounts or minimum salaries. In reality, teachers may earn more because the school affords to pay them more, and also because they receive benefits for public servants paid from the central as well as the local budgets.

³⁶ We did not include teachers that won big awards on Olympiads as this would have biased the average of teachers with a high total pay. Two teachers in the database won awards at Olympiads in the amount of 100,000 MNT each and this particular teacher (teacher code 40) also won 100,000 MNT as part of the outcomes-contract. With the exception of the quarterly performance bonus of 40 percent, we did not include the yearly given Olympiad and outcomes-contracts bonuses.

5.2. THE TRIPLE BONUS SYSTEMS

There are currently three types of bonuses given to teachers; some are more clearly defined than others:

- bonus for winning at Olympiads or competitions
- bonus for outcomes-contract
- skills bonus for quarterly performance (also referred to as A, B, C bonus)

5.2.1. Bonus for Olympiads and Competitions

This particular type of bonus is a legacy from the socialist past and existed throughout the CEEICIS region. It has become controversial among educators because it encourages teachers to focus on the best-performing students, rather than pay attention and give support to each student in the class. Curiously, the philosophy of Olympiads/competition is diametrically opposed to promotion requirements (promotion to methodologist, lead teacher, and advisor) as well as outcomes-contracts, in which the performance of the entire class of students—rather than high-performing individual students—is used as a reward criterion. Nevertheless, these Olympiads and competitions are very popular among teachers for social as well as financial reasons. They are professional networking events for committed teachers.

The awards for Olympiads and competitions are given twice a year to those students, as well as their teachers, who scored among the first three ranks. In addition, teachers hold their own Olympiads and compete against each other. Teachers receive a higher award if they themselves win than if their students win. Olympiads exist at the district, province, and national level. The interviews show that teachers were awarded prizes in the range of 5 percent to 50 percent of their monthly salaries for their performance in Olympiads or competitions.

From the 123 teachers in this study database, forty-eight (48) teachers or 40 percent of all teachers were awarded prizes for their performance in Olympiads or competitions. Even though the number of teachers who win Olympiad or competition awards is high, the ratio of 40 percent is most likely not representative of the entire teaching workforce in the country.³⁷

5.2.2. Bonus for Outcomes-Contract

Outcomes-contracts (Mongolian: *ür dūngiin geree*) have been well documented in the research literature.³⁸ After public protests of teachers in the mid-1990s, the base salary was supplemented with qualification and skills bonuses to augment the salary of teachers. This particular regulation from 1995 was one of the predecessors of the bonus for the outcomes-contract that came into effect as of 2003. The revitalized form, however, has more in common with the public sector management and finance reform than with the regulation from the mid-1990s. These contracts are not restricted to teachers but are used for all public servants, and are an offspring of the results-based management initiative that, with seed funding from the Asian Development Bank, made it into the public administration sector a few years

³⁷ There might very well be a selection bias in that principals or education managers scheduled interviews with the best-performing teachers that represent the different age groups in the teaching staff. Our only sampling criterion for the selection of teachers was maximum variety with regard to age/teaching experience.

³⁸ See Steiner-Khamsi, Gita and Stolpe, Ines (2006). "Outcomes-Based Education: Banking on Policy Import." Chapter 7 of *Educational Import. Local Encounters with Global Forces in Mongolia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Translated in Mongolian as "Боловсролын бодлогын импорт: Даяар шинэчлэл ба Монголын орон нутгийн хүчин зүйлс" Улаанбаатар: Адмон.

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ago.³⁹ This reform is not genuinely Mongolian but in fact represents one of the many “traveling reforms” that were implemented in Mongolia and elsewhere. In the research literature, these kind of results-based or performance-based bonuses are referred to as “New Contractualism,” “New Accountability,” or “Governance by Contract.” This form of bonuses is supposed to replace rewards based on informal networks. For only a very short period during the initial phase of the reform⁴⁰, the bonus for good performance on the outcomes-contract was centrally funded from the national education budget. Now, schools are expected to fund the awards for outstanding performance on the outcomes-contract from the school budget, that is, either from savings made at the end of the year or from additional income that a school has raised.

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There is a culture of contracts and regulations in schools in Mongolia, and it is important to point out that outcomes-contracts, job descriptions, regulations and other agreements do not only exist between education managers and teachers, but also for each individual working at the school, including the students.

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This study found that, according to the managers, twelve schools gave outcomes-based bonuses. Also, 32 percent of the interviewed teachers reported having received an outcomes-based award. This study also showed that there were no differences with regard to awards given to teachers in rural, semi-urban and urban schools.

Perhaps equally important as the financial award function of the outcomes-contract is the punitive function of the contracts. Even though the Labor Law in Mongolia is rigorous when it comes to protecting the rights of employees, the annual outcomes contracts are used to revoke teaching licenses and eventually fire teachers. There are several regulations that reflect the heightened teacher accountability environment in Mongolia:

- **MECS Ministerial Order #561, December 14, 2009, “Common Guidelines towards Planning, Assessing and Evaluating Teacher Work in Schools of General Education”**
 - Appendix 1 of the Order #561 provides the criteria for outcomes-contracts as well as examples. The education manager—acting on behalf of the school principal—must evaluate teachers and score their performance with regard to the outcomes-contract as follows: very good [*mash sain*] (A), good [*sain*] (B), satisfactory [*khangalttai*] (C), insufficient [*dutagdaltai*] (D), or unsatisfactory [*khangaltgui*] (E). There are several measures proposed for teachers who, according to the education manager, perform at the (E) level: the manager can punish a teacher, assign extra-work to a teacher, enroll the teacher in appropriate training that help her to acquire the required knowledge and skills, and as the most extreme measure, lay the teacher off (see point 4.6, Appendix 1).

³⁹ Outcomes-based education was introduced as part of the public sector management and finance reform. The first reform was approved in 1999 and the second, in the amount of \$15.5 million, granted in October 2003. The second loan targeted accountability and efficiency in health, education, social welfare, and labor. In 2003, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science published a 319-page handbook on outcomes-based education with numerous examples of student benchmarks and teacher scorecards. For more historical background information see Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006, chapter 7), mentioned in the previous footnote.

⁴⁰ In the education sector, the reform was implemented in 2003.

- **MECS Ministerial Order #74, November 13, 2008, “On Approving the Procedure for Issuing and Revoking Teacher’s License”**
 - The Order outlines the work of the “Teacher-Licensing Committee” and explains the procedure for those teachers who apply for a new teacher’s license (including those who have changed their specialization) as well as those whose license was revoked and request to be reinstated. The license may be revoked for a variety of reasons, listed in the MECS Order #74. It may also be revoked based on the recommendation of the local “Ethics Council” (see section 3.1.2).

- **MECS Ministerial Order #41, February 12, 2007, “Ethics Rule of General Education School and Kindergarten Teachers”**
 - The Order presents the ethical norms of teachers and lays out the sanctions in case of non-compliance with the norms. In addition, the role of the newly established Ethics Councils is described.

These three orders together have changed the work conditions in schools considerably. Contrary to before, it is now possible to revoke a teaching license and terminate the employment of a teacher. Outcomes-contracts are often used to document the below-standard performance of a teacher. From the perspective of the Teachers Union of Mongolia, the outcomes-contracts in effect transformed the teaching profession in Mongolia into a one-year term-appointment that, assuming good performance, is renewed every year. In other words, the outcomes-contract has made teachers vulnerable and subject to annual evaluation by education managers and, in the case of conflict, higher levels of administration. Such a contract is typically very broad and deals with all kinds of performance areas concerning a teacher, ranging from genuinely pedagogical tasks (improving outcome of students, preparing lessons, etc.) to tasks that have little impact on teaching quality (e.g., submitting reports in time, communication skills and appearance of teacher, etc.). The revocation of licenses more often than not leads to legal battles, and in the end, the only licenses revoked have been of those teachers who, due to geographic distance, did not have access to help from lawyers of the Teachers Union.

In two of the schools from the UNICEF sample, all of the teachers received the same percentage of their salary for the annual outcomes-based supplement (30 percent), while in all other schools, the payment varied from 10–50 percent of the monthly salary. There seems to be no limitation for the outcomes-based bonus, in practice. This bonus is clearly subject to the educational fund that the school managed to accumulate from savings or from additional income. Thus, resource-rich schools are able to provide higher awards for the outcomes-contracts than smaller schools that, due to the higher per capita cost, are not able to save from the entitled variable part of the budget (salary fund) or simply have few additional sources of income.

5.2.3. Bonus for Skills-Based Quarterly Performance

This particular bonus (A, B, C Bonus) is part of the salary fund and is centrally allocated to schools; this is spelled out in the Government Order #54 of December 10, 2008, “On According Pecuniary Incentives Based on Quarterly Work Results.”⁴¹ The Order specifies the criteria for each group of employees in the school: teachers, education managers, principals, school social workers, school dormitory teachers, school librarians, school doctors, as well as accountants, treasurers, cooks, plumbers, electricians,

⁴¹ Signed by the Prime Minister, Minister of Education, Culture and Science, and Minister of Finance.

carpenters, guards, cleaners and firemen employed by the school. For each group, four performance criteria are provided. In an attempt to illustrate the vagueness of the performance criteria, Table 17 lists the criteria that must be used to evaluate the performance of teachers, education managers, and principals. The text in Table 17 includes direct excerpts from Government Order #54.

Unsurprisingly, the interviewed education managers complained about the vague criteria for the quarterly performance bonus, but also the overlap in evaluation criteria with the outcomes-based annual bonus.

It is striking that teachers and education managers refer to the scores A, B, C and D even though the regulation from 2008 (Government Order #54) reduced the categories to two: score A for staff members who fulfill 90-100 percent of all criteria and score B for those who have accomplished 71-89 percent of the criteria. In all the schools that were introduced, the managers continued to use A, B, C, and D grades rather than the new two categories. The new regulation was an attempt to suspend the practice of distributing skills-based quarterly performance bonuses to everyone on the staff and replace the distribution practice with one that is performance-based. This study examined whether this intended change really occurred.

Table 17: Evaluation Criteria for Quarterly Performance Bonus; Excerpts

2.1.1.	The following criteria should be used to accord quarterly incentives for teachers of schools:
2.1.1.1.	Planning and development of lesson plans;
2.1.1.2.	Implementation and improvement of the curriculum;
2.1.1.3.	Development and usage of teaching aids and creation/building of physical and psychological learning environment
2.1.1.4.	Changes/Progress in the development and growth of students.
2.1.2.	The following criteria should be used to accord quarterly incentives for training managers of schools and methodologists of children's kindergarten:
2.1.2.1.	Planning and development of training plans of the school and curricula for all subjects in all grades;
2.1.2.2.	Implementation and improvement of the training plans and curricula;
2.1.2.3.	Usage of teaching aids and creation of physical and psychological learning environment;
2.1.2.4.	Changes/Progress in the development and growth of teachers and students.
2.1.3.	The following criteria should be used to accord quarterly incentives for school directors and heads of children's kindergarten:
2.1.3.1.	School development policy and plan;
2.1.3.2.	Implementation, improvement/review, and monitoring of the school development policy and plan;
2.1.3.3.	Creation, utilization and effectiveness of the school facilities; creation of positive team spirits;
2.1.3.4.	Changes/Progress in the development and growth of students.

Source: Annex to Government Order #54, December 10, 2008.

As with the other two bonuses, the education managers are in charge of evaluating the teacher's eligibility for a bonus. As mentioned before, the reward criteria are very vague and difficult to determine, according to the education managers. It is perhaps for this reason that this bonus has been modified at the school

level in ways that make it a non-performance-based salary addition. There is a tendency for schools to give the same amount to all teachers, except for those who are clearly underperforming. Frequently, all teachers of a school receive 30 percent of their base salary every four months as part of the bonus for the skills-based quarterly performance. This translates to a salary supplement of 7.5 percent of the base salary per month for almost every teacher in Mongolia.

From the 123 teachers in the database of this study, only one teacher did not receive a quarterly performance bonus. This means that 99.2 percent of all teachers receive a bonus, most of them for the same percentage of their base salaries. As mentioned before, however, there might have been a selection bias among the interviewed teachers and this ratio may be over-reported. Therefore, the research team of this study also interviewed a total of 35 education managers in 28 schools and asked how many teachers did not receive a performance-based bonus in the last quarter. Of the 35 interviewed education managers,

- 29 education managers (83 percent) answered “none”; that is all teachers received a quarterly performance-bonus;
- three education managers (9 percent) answered that one teacher (typically a teacher that clearly underperforms) did not receive the quarterly bonus; and
- three education managers (9 percent) answered that there was a problem with the salary fund and that they have not yet made the quarterly payments.

In other words, only nine percent of schools withhold quarterly bonus payments to teachers. The education managers confirmed that only in exceptional cases is the bonus withheld to signal to the teacher that major changes in behavior or performance are expected. Thus, the quarterly bonus payments are not used to reward high-performing teachers, but instead are only used to punish poor-performing teachers. Apart from the ambiguity of the evaluation criteria, it is perhaps also for cultural reasons that only poor performance is punished while high performance is not especially recognized in the form of bonus payments. Despite attempts to suspend the social redistribution practice, seen most recently in 2008 when the award-winning scores were reduced to two categories (A and B), education managers and principals in effect undermine the idea of performance-based bonuses by handing out bonuses to almost everybody on the staff.

This clearly defeats the purpose of the results-based public administration reform. In effect, the bonus functions as a 13th monthly base salary rather than as a performance award. What is called into the question is not the social redistribution practice, but rather the multiplicity of awards that, except for the controversial Olympiads and competitions, are very vaguely defined and are therefore susceptible to subjective judgment and non-formal evaluation criteria.

5.3. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The empirical data gathered at the school level enable us to estimate actual salaries or total pay of teachers. The average total monthly pay of teachers—with additional teaching hours, functional and rank supplements, and bonuses—is 374,171 MNT. A typical high-income total pay for a teacher is 546,737 MNT, and a typical low-income total monthly income is 317, 079 MNT.

This chapter also analyzed the bonus system in greater detail. The bonus system in Mongolia is deeply

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flawed and deserves a thorough revision. It is a system that has developed over time and now includes components and aspects that are incongruent with each other. Over the past two decades, the bonus system for outcomes-based contracts and quarterly performance payments was merely added to a system that already operated with skills bonuses. This is an example of additive school reform in which new practices and regulations are merely added to existing ones without replacing, or phasing out, previous regulations.

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Each bonus system is problematic in itself for a different reason:

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- The bonuses for Olympiads and competitions reward teachers for focusing on high-performing students.
- The bonuses for outcomes-based contracts entirely rely on funds generated at the school level and thus generate inequalities between large (resource-rich) schools and small (resource-poor) schools.
- The bonuses for quarterly performance are financed from the centrally allocated salary fund but, in effect, function as a 13th monthly salary in that the bonus is given indiscriminately to almost every teacher at the school, thus undermining the purpose of the bonus.

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The following Table 18 presents the main features of the three bonuses and also summarizes the empirical findings from the study with regard to the actual beneficiaries. The column on actual beneficiaries lists the percentage of teachers who received the bonus in the past quarter or in the past year, respectively, in the 28 examined schools of this study.

From the perspective of education managers, there is considerable overlap in the evaluation criteria for the outcomes-based contract and the quarterly performance payments. Even though both bonus types require significant paper work from the education managers, they are ultimately vague, and the evaluations come across as arbitrary. As a result, education managers do not dare to make harsh judgments on teachers' performance for fear of being criticized for being biased and corrupt. There is a need to reconcile or integrate the two bonuses systems of outcomes-based contracts and quarterly performance payments.

In addition, there is a need to revisit the evaluation criteria. The outcomes-contracts do comprise a formative student evaluation component. That is, teachers are in principle rewarded for student progress over the course of the school year and are thereby encouraged to draw attention to mentoring individual students. For a variety of reasons, however, formative student evaluation is not strictly enforced. The outcomes-contracts are driven by self-assessment and only in rare cases is the performance of the teacher rigorously assessed externally. As a result, teachers inflate the grades of their students towards the end of the school year in order to document progress over the course of the past few months. Nevertheless, strengthening formative student evaluation and encouraging attention to weak students would be very much needed if schools seek to systematically attract out-of-school children and retain them in school until the end of compulsory education or beyond.

Table 18: Main Features of the Three Types of Bonuses

Type of bonus	Intended purpose and frequency of award	Financing source	Actual beneficiaries as % of all teachers in the study (N=123)	Average ratio as % of monthly base salary
Olympiads & Competitions	Rewards teachers who developed high-performing students in class; awarded once or twice a year.	Special Fund from Central, <i>Aimag</i> , or <i>Soum</i> Budget	40.0%	5% - 50%
Outcomes-Based Contracts	Rewards teachers on a variety of performance criteria, including overall class performance, lesson planning, communication skills, etc.; Awarded once a year.	Education Fund of the School	29.0%	30%
Quarterly Performance Payment	Reward teachers who did exceptionally well (score A) or well (score B) on 4 evaluation criteria; Awarded all 3 months.	Centrally Allocated Salary Fund	99.2%	10-15%

In addition, it is problematic that schools are encouraged to use funds from their School Education Fund for rewarding teachers. There is a tendency for the school administrations to use all their savings and generated income on themselves and the school staff, rather than on students or on buying books, supplies, and other learning materials. Earlier studies on the School Education Fund (also known as School Development Fund), carried out for DANIDA, showed that schools spend most of the money in that fund for the professional development of teachers, for excursions with school staff, and other activities that benefit the education and support staff at the school. This practice is reminiscent of the times when the teacher salaries were low and unattractive and additional sources had to be used to incentivize and retain teachers. These days, however, it is not necessary to make extra payments to teachers from the School Education Fund. In other words, schools should not be encouraged to use the outcomes-contract award mechanism to additionally fund teachers from the School Education Fund.

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CHAPTER 6

TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS

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CHAPTER 6: TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness of teaching may ultimately only be assessed, comparatively that is, by comparing student outcomes in Mongolia with that in other countries. Mongolia has not yet participated in these kind of IEA or OECD-type of studies (TIMSS, PISA) and earlier regional and international studies (such as MLA) are by now dated.

In the absence from such reliable, international comparative measures, this study has resorted to posing a few key questions that relate to teacher effectiveness:

(1) What percentage of teachers serve as substitute teachers, that is, teach subjects for which they were not trained?

(2) What are the licensing criteria and quality assurance mechanisms?

(3) How and for which groups of teachers is in-service teacher training provided?

This last chapter briefly addresses these three issues in an attempt to shed light on some of the key aspects of teacher effectiveness.

6.1. THE SUBSTITUTION OF TEACHERS AND NON-LICENSED TEACHERS

There are three groups of teachers who work as non-licensed teachers in Mongolia:

Group 1 **Young teachers:** New teachers who graduated from pre-service teacher education and have only taught for one or two years. In most cases, they are granted a teaching license after submitting relevant documents for review (see section 6.2.).

Group 2 **Non-teachers:** Professionals with a higher education degree who switched to the teaching profession (e.g., economist who teaches math).

Group 3 **Teachers with another subject specialization:** Teachers who teach subjects for which they had no teacher training (e.g., math teacher who teaches biology).

The teachers in the groups 2 and 3 are considered—in international terminology—substitute teachers. Substitute teachers have become an object of great scrutiny in the TIMSS and PISA studies, specifically in the PISA 2006 study that dealt with science literacy. There is globally a shortage of math and science teachers, and schools in many countries substitute the teachers for these subjects with other teachers who did not have training in math or science. It is believed that the quality of instruction suffers if a subject is taught by a non-specialist or by a substitute teacher. The poor results of students in Kyrgyzstan in the PISA 2006 study, for example, were directly linked to a shortage of science teachers. Schools in Kyrgyzstan—but also in any country where there is a shortage—compensate for the shortage by hiring non-specialist substitute teachers. Apart from teacher shortages, there exist, however, other reasons for hiring substitute teachers.

The 28 examined schools in this study hire for the following two reasons substitute teachers:

- **Shortage in particular subjects:** This applies in particular to music teaching but also to a lesser extent, English, primary school, biology and chemistry. Thirteen (13) of the 35 education managers reported a shortage of music teachers in their division. This has to do with the fact that pre-service teacher education institutions do not offer a specialization in music education.⁴² In contrast to the significant lack of music teachers, the other shortages are negligible.
- **Not enough hours to hire a teacher full-time:** Schools assign teachers hours in additional subjects so that they have a full teaching load and a full-time job. This applies especially to single-subject teachers in fields that typically have low instructional hours. For example, a biology teacher in a small secondary school with one class per grade was unlikely to have a full-time job, unless the education managers assign additional hours in subjects for which the teacher did not have any training. This particular problem would be resolved if pre-service teacher education programs would only offer multi-subject teacher preparation (e.g., prepare teachers in biology and chemistry rather than in one subject alone). In this study, eight (8) out of 35 education managers identified the small teaching load of teachers as main reason for hiring substitute teachers.

Strikingly, the prototype of a teacher who takes on many additional hours in other subjects only to improve the income disappeared in the wake of the 2007 salary reform. Assigning additional hours in additional subjects used to be, at closer examination, a “retention strategy” of school administrators to ensure that qualified and experienced teachers did not quit the job because of the low base salary.

There is, however, a need to insert a disclaimer here. We have reasons to suggest that education managers underreport the number of substitute teachers at their school for commonsensical reasons; that is, they believe that an experienced teacher or a (non-specialist) teacher who has been teaching a particular subject for many years is as effective in teaching as a young teacher with the “correct” subject specialization or license. Repeatedly, education managers assured us during the interviews that experienced teachers who lack the subject specialization are as effective, if not more so, than young subject specialists.

6.2. LICENSING PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA

For the first group of non-licensed teachers—recent graduates of pre-service teacher education—the licensing requirements appear to be in fact more tedious than for the second group and third groups of non-licensed teachers. The second and third groups only need to take “specialization conversion” courses in teacher training institutions to receive a license for teaching in the particular subject. The universities have a greater autonomy in the licensing of specialization or degree converters than in licensing their own graduates. The following may explain the discrepancies in this area of quality assurance:

⁴² The Arts and Culture University offers a program with dual-majors cultural studies and music teaching or conducting and teaching. However, rarely do these graduates choose teaching as their career; they pursue the other major. Alternatively, the School/College of Culture graduates who usually become the employees in charge of Culture Centers at *soums* do not go into (full-time) teaching as they would need to enroll in the specialization conversion courses for 1 year (and often stay unemployed during that time). But in *soum*-center schools these professionals, with a background in cultural studies, tend to work as part-time music teachers.

Group 1

Young teachers: New teachers who apply for a teaching license for the first time must, according to MECS Ministerial Order #74 of November 13, 2008, submit the following material to the Teacher-Licensing Committee:⁴³

1. *Application letter by the teacher*
2. *Reference letter on the teacher's/applicant's work performance*
3. *Notarized copies of diploma(s)*
4. *Notarized copy of teacher's social insurance record book*
5. *Observation protocol from teachers who observed and monitored the applicant's demonstration lesson (at least one demonstration lesson is required) and its lesson plan*
6. *Minutes and decision of the meeting of the Teacher's Council in which the applicant's performance was discussed and the eligibility for obtaining a teaching license was recommended*
7. *Minutes of parents' meeting in which the applicant's performance report was discussed*
8. *Order issued by the principal or direction of the education institution on issuing [or reinstating] a teaching license*
9. *Decision taken by the local Education Department on whether the applicant/teacher fulfills the requirements for a teaching license specified in the Procedure*
10. *2 photographs (3 cm x 4 cm)*

As outlined in the "Procedure for Issuing and Revoking a Teacher's License" (MECS Ministerial Order #74), several individuals and institutions are involved in reviewing the performance of the young specialist who applies for the teaching license after one or two years of teaching. The more experienced teachers at the school who observe the applicant's lesson(s), the Teacher's Council at the school, the Parents' Meeting at the school, the principal, and finally the director of the Education Department at the province or city level must all support the application and review it favorably. In the 28 examined schools of this study, a total of 52 young teachers were not yet licensed; several of them had submitted all of the required documents after their first year of teaching and were waiting for months into their second year of teaching to find out whether or not their application was approved.

Group 2

Non-Teachers (unqualified teachers): MECS Ministerial Order #74 specifies the procedure as follows:

"An individual with a higher education degree who has not graduated from a teacher training institution, yet wants to teach at a school in areas that are related to his/her professional qualifications, must attend and complete a "specialization conversion training" that is provided by teacher training institutions. In that training, he/she must acquire the required credit hours in general as well as in specialized didactics courses and work with the newly attained subject discipline at an education institution [school] for a year, before obtaining a teaching license. "

⁴³ MECS Ministerial Order #74, November 13, 2008, "On Approving the Procedure for Issuing and Revoking a Teacher's License." The list of document that needs to be submitted is presented in section 4.3. of Order #74.

Upon completion of the specialization conversion training, the (unqualified) teachers in this group must submit the same documents listed above for the new teachers.

Group 3 Teachers with another subject specialization (under-qualified teachers: The procedure for receiving an additional teaching license in a second or third subject is straightforward. As with the second group, the teacher training institutions offer “specialization conversion training” for this particular group of under-qualified teachers. Furthermore, as with the other two groups of applicants, they must teach first for one year in the new subject before applying for the license.

The “specialization conversion training” is a significant source of income for teacher training institutions. In most cases, the unqualified teacher (professional without teacher qualifications) and the under-qualified teacher (teacher with another subject specialization) have to self-finance this supplementary degree. The licensing procedure is in itself a remarkable quality assurance mechanism for teacher effectiveness, even though it is a new mechanism that was only instituted within the past few years. The main issue for pre-service as well as in-service teacher training is the quality of the training. Even though a teacher ends up being formally qualified and eventually licensed after having completed all the requirements of a teacher training institution, she/he is not necessarily an effective teacher due to the low quality of some teacher training institutions.

6.3. IN-SERVICE TEACHER TRAINING

In-service teacher education was revamped in 2008 with the MECS Ministerial Order #72. Three types of in-service training have been introduced⁴⁴:

- **Basic Training:** funded from the national education budget. Each teacher is entitled to a comprehensive training program every five years. The first year teacher is entitled to 7 days of training, the fifth year teacher to 14 days, and the teacher in her/his tenth year of teaching was eligible for 21 days of in-service training.
- **Specialized Training:** both credit-bearing as well as non-credit courses.
- **Independent Studies:** individual, distance learning/correspondence studies, other types.

This study reviewed the actual implementation of the Order #74 at the central level, in Ulaanbaatar, and in the 28 selected schools of the study.

At the central level, only the fifth year teachers have been targeted to date due to budgetary constraints. But it is anticipated that in 2012 also first and tenth year teachers will be enrolled in seven days (56 hours) or 21 days (168 hours) of training, respectively. One-third of the teaching workforce is young and there is recognition in the Department of General Education at MECS that first year teachers, and in general young teachers, should urgently become beneficiaries of in-service training.

⁴⁴ Besides the education managers in the 28 examined schools, we would like to thank N. Nergui, senior specialist at the General Education Department of MECS, as well as G. Shurentsetseg, specialist of social and legal education, Mr. Enkhbat, specialist of mathematics education and L. Urtnasan, specialist of primary education from the City Education Department for providing us documents that explain the legal framework as well as the enrollment figures for in-service training.

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The central level also reviews and approves courses that are submitted for the specialized courses. For the academic year 2010/11, thirty-six (36) organizations submitted a total of 180 training modules; of those 88 were approved. There is no approval required at the central level for the non-credit courses. The credit-bearing courses are self-financed and count towards the promotion criteria of teachers. The Education and Culture Department offers mostly non-credit courses. They would be eligible to offer also credit-bearing courses but, with the exception of the City Education Department, they tend to focus on non-credit courses.

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The idea of life-long learning of teachers, translated into intensive training every five years, existed until the early 1990s. It had to be suspended because of the high costs associated with this kind of universal in-service training of teachers. The MECS Ministerial Order #72 reintroduced this popular provision even though the budgetary implications of this important, yet expensive, in-service teacher training model has not been resolved to date.

At the city level (Ulaanbaatar), the City Department of Education embarked on the basic training provision for first year and fifth year teachers. They are in the midst of implementing the regulation. They enrolled, for example, 92 teachers in history and geography for a 14-day workshop that was organized by MECS. These basic courses are offered by MECS directly; the City Education Department merely coordinates these centrally administered efforts at the city level.

The main area of activity at the central level relates to the specialized courses. As mentioned above, MECS has to approve the credit-bearing courses that are typically self-financed by teachers. Each credit translates into the number of contact hours (an academic contact hour is 45 minutes). Thus, a one-credit course requires 24 hours (three days) and a two-credit course, 48 hours or three days of attendance. The credit-bearing courses are typically offered during vacation or instruction-free days and cost 9,000 – 15,000 MNT for one credit.

At the school level, the research team analyzed actual in-service training of teachers (N=123) and also solicited feedback on the current provision of in-service teacher training. Every school is supposed to have a Teacher Professional Development Plan, administered by the education manager. The Plan is supposed to ensure that teachers have an equal chance of attending school-financed professional development opportunities. In our qualitative interviews, we asked to see the Teacher Professional Development Plan, but only few of the schools had such a plan readily available. The research team also garnered feedback on the current provision of in-service teacher education. In general, teachers were enthusiastic about the intensive workshops offered to teachers every five years. They also believed that school-based training constituted one of the most effective ways of quality improvement.

6.4. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the past few years, great attention has been given to teacher effectiveness both in Mongolia as well as internationally. In an attempt to implement a quality assurance mechanism, a teacher licensing scheme was introduced (MECS Ministerial Order #74) in 2008. It targeted not only new teachers in the first two years of their teaching, but also professionals from other fields who switched to the teaching profession. In addition, it was aimed at teachers who were teaching an additional second or third subject for which they did not have a license. As a result of this regulation, “specialization conversion training

programs” mushroomed, very much to the financial benefit of teacher training institutions. An evaluation of these training programs that are largely self-financed is urgently needed. There were also major delays reported at the school level in the review of the licensing applications. It is recommended to streamline and simplify the application procedure, especially for the young specialists who are supposed to submit their application package one year after they graduated from pre-service teacher training.

A second major initiative to enhance teacher effectiveness was launched with the comprehensive in-service teacher training strategy. MECS Ministerial Order #72 from 2008 prescribes a comprehensive and coherent system of in-service teacher training that includes (a) basic training every five years, (b) specialized training with credit-bearing as well as non-credit courses, and (c) independent studies. The basic training has been resurrected from the past and has remained very popular among teachers. It seems that teachers raise their expectations of promotion by enrolling in credit-bearing courses that, more often than not, are self-financed. The proportion of teachers who have been promoted to lead teacher or advisor teacher has diminished and has thus generated unease among teachers who have invested financially in their own professional development. The self-finance regulations as well as the close association between professional development and promotion (see Table 7) need to be revisited.

The so-called basic training that, within a five-year period, will have reached out to every teacher in the country is impressive and comprehensive. Until today, the central level was only able to secure funding for the fifth year teachers. The City Department of Education succeeded in enrolling not only fifth year teachers, but also started to reach out to first year teachers. Additional funding is needed to enroll first year and tenth year teachers across the country.

As mentioned in the Preface, Mongolia is changing at a rapid pace economically and socially. The situation of teachers—their recruitment, their professional development, and their retention—is closely related to changes in the society at large. The reforms of the past few years, in particular from 2007 onwards, attempted to take into account the need for a greater number of qualified and motivated teachers. The expansion of schooling from 10 to 12 years, internal migration from rural to urban schools, and higher education explosion were the main drivers for investing in teacher education and improving the conditions of the teacher profession. Over the past five years, economic growth has transformed the fabric of Mongolian society. The challenges keep changing, but the need to continuously improve the quality of education by effectively targeting recruitment into teaching, professional development, and teacher retention has remained the same.

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CHAPTER 6: TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS

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(Footnotes)

¹ Government Resolution #239 (Renewal of the Salary Scheme and the Minimum Salary of Public Servants) of September 15, 2010, determines the salaries of public servants. The base salary of teachers ranges between 298,428 MNT for teachers with 1-5 years of work experience and 350,157 MNT for teachers with 25 or more years of experience. In Table 1, we used the average of the salary range (324,292 MNT).

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² In Mongolia, the total pay includes base salary, payment for additional teaching hours, supplements for functions, rank supplement, and bonuses. We calculated the average total pay per month based on the interviews with 123 teachers collected in the UNICEF Mongolia Study on Teachers. Please see chapter 5 (Figure 15 in this report) for the calculation of the average total pay in Mongolia.

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³ Minister of Education, Culture and Science, Minister of Social Protection and Labor, and Minister of Finance. (2007). *Joint Order #307/91/237 on adopting the procedure to set the work norms of kindergarten and general education school teachers, and to calculate and discharge the salaries of teachers and certain other officials*. Ulaanbaatar: August 31, 2007.

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